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Abstract 
Unemployment is one of the main issues countries must manage to achieve economic growth. 
The different behaviour showed in Europe and US triggered academic research to investigate 
which are the motivations behind this phenomenon. Thus, labour market flexibility and the 
hysteretic behaviour of unemployment became major subjects of study in Economics 
literature. 
The present paper first starts with a full description of these two variables through descriptive 
statistics and an empirical analysis of hysteresis, using both panel data and time-series 
methodologies. Once verified the presence of a Unit Root in European unemployment, the 
investigation moves further implementing a simple econometric model to examine whether 
labour market regulation influenced unemployment and employment rate in Europe between 
2000 and 2013. The short period of time considered is balanced using regional data, which 
allow to build a large dataset and to take advantage of the asymmetry given by different 
(regional) labour markets functioning under the same set of (national) institutions.  
Results show the efficacy of employment protection in reducing (increasing) unemployment 
(employment) in the period considered. 
While restricting the sample to the years of sustained economic growth preceding the 
financial crisis the relationship between EPL and Employment Rate becomes not significant, 
for unemployment results hold. However, the effect is the opposite considering only core or 
peripheral countries of Europe, with the latter group experiencing higher unemployment rates 
the higher the strictness of employment protection. Moreover, peculiarities of the Germany 
Labour Market play an important role in determining the significance of the results. It is then 
probable the presence of heterogeneity across countries and the possible influence of some 
unobserved variables. 
It seems then mandatory to consider the structural peculiarity of each area when 
implementing structural reforms on labour market regulation. 
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Introduction and Review of the Literature 
Unemployment has always been one of the key parameters to measure the health of the 
economy. Its social and economic costs are fundamental in measuring the efficacy of the 
political class and of its intervention in the economy. 
The financial crisis of 2008, followed by the sovereign debt turmoil of 2011, strongly 
increased the unemployment rate of most of the European countries and depressed the overall 
economy of Europe; the recovery process that started in 2013 has been low and full of 
difficulties for the Union, and only in 2016-2017 it began to be strong and common across all 
States and regions1. 
This double negative shock strongly challenged the fundamentals of the European Union, 
introducing doubts on the appropriateness of the size of the Eurozone and its inability to 
properly use monetary policies. However, mainstream economics does not address much 
power to this economic tool to shape the economy in the long-run. Talking about 
unemployment, for example, the current rate U always tends to go back to its natural rate U* 
[Friedman M., 1968]. Nevertheless, most economists think monetary policy can push U away 
from U* at least for a short period of time (few years), as Paul Volker managed to do in 1980-
1983 raising unemployment in the US [Ball L., 2009]. 
Since those years, indeed, after the stagflation phenomena hit Europe and US in the 70s, 
disinflationary economic policies started all across developed countries making 
unemployment rise, in particular in Europe. This long-run trade off can explain most of the 
behaviour of unemployment and inflation in the past, but it does not in the more recent years, 
where the hypothesis of a hysteretic labour market seems to be the most promising 
explanation [Gali, 2015]. 
The hysteresis hypothesis has first been proposed in a paper published by Blanchard and 
Summers in 1986, “Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem”. The authors 
challenge conventional classic or Keynesian theories, and propose an explanation of the 
persistently high Unemployment Rate in Europe through the insider-outsider hypothesis, i.e. a 
wage-setting asymmetry between those who are employed (insiders) and those who are not 
(outsiders). Results are that the higher is the bargaining power of insiders, which basically 
derives from the level of their job protection, the stronger is the persistence in unemployment. 
The article of Blanchard and Summers opened then a new field of study of unemployment 
behaviour and the influence of labour market institutions. 
                                                 
1 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/what-to-watch-in-europe-in-2017/ 
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First, plenty of papers analysed whether the unemployment rate is truly hysteretic or not, 
through Unit Root tests with time-series or panel data methods, as for example Ledesma L. 
and Miguel (2000), Bornhorst E. and Commander S. (2004), Camarero M., Silvestre J., 
Tamarit C. (2004), Ball L. (2009), Khraeif N. et Al. (2015), Galì J. (2015); Results are mixed 
for OECD countries, and one of the few consolidated evidence is that United States 
unemployment does not show a Unit Root, i.e. it is stationary (Gordon R., 2015). 
Second, many authors investigated the relationship between countries’ labour market 
regulation and unemployment level and change over time. Scarpetta S. (1996), Nickell S. 
(1997 and 1999), Blanchard O. and Wolfers J. (2000), Belot M., Van Ours J. (2001), Nickell 
S., Nunziata L., Ochel W. (2005), Verdugo L. et Al, (2012), Andresson et Al. (2014) find 
evidences of the importance of labour market flexibility in determining both the structural 
level of unemployment of a country and its adjustment speed over time, even though 
distinctions must be provided among different sets of institutions. 
The present work will follow both lines of research, to provide an overall analysis of the 
relationship between unemployment and employment protection legislation in Europe using 
regional data, from 2000 to 2013. 
First, section 1 describes employment and unemployment in Europe both at regional and 
country level, also testing (and finding) the presence of a Unit Root both with panel and time-
series approaches.  
Second, section 2 focuses on the measure of the flexibility of the labour market, describing 
the situation in Europe both through the OECD EPL Index, widely used in the papers 
mentioned above, and the Fraser Index of labour market regulation, an alternative source of 
data to test whether there are differences or not across indicators. 
Third, section 3 merges the previous analysis to study the impact of labour market institutions 
in the dynamics of the labour market proposing two different approaches: 
1) A simple linear model between unemployment and labour market regulation; 
2) A deeper analysis on the relationship between labour market regulation and different 
economic structures, using employment sectorial data; 
 Conclusions, then, summarizes the findings and try to discuss eventual economic policy 
implications. 
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Section 1: Unemployment Overview 
1.A Review of the Theory 
The amount of active population in the economy is defined as the total amount of people aged 
between 15 and 64 years old (N), i.e. in the working age, currently working or looking for a 
job. Those who are not employed but want to work are unemployed people. This measure is 
usually expressed as the ratio (U) between total unemployed people and the active population, 
and it should not be confused with the non-participation rate (1-P), the amount of people who 
can be part of the active population (i.e. people in the working age) but who are not working 
nor looking for a job. On the other hand, the employment rate (L) is defined as the ratio 
between the employed people and the total working age population. 
Applying some algebra2, the relationship between unemployment and employment levels 
becomes: 
∆𝑈 ≅
𝛥𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑡−1
+
𝛥𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
−
𝛥𝐿𝑡
𝐿𝑡−1
 
This equation shows that changes in the parameters might have different effects on 
unemployment. For example, if the labour force shrinks it is possible that U falls without L 
rising. Moreover, a determined level of U might reflect different situations: a dynamic market 
in which workers frequently change their job getting in and out of unemployment quickly, or 
it might be a sign of hysteric labour market, i.e. a market which is rigid and where 
unemployment is persistent. 
Some argue that economic policies should not consider only the unemployment rate but also 
the non-participation rate. However, macroeconomic textbooks do not focus on this parameter 
and it is not usually considered in empirical research3. 
The next step, then, is to find the determinants of the levels of unemployment each economy 
experiences, beginning from prices of goods and salaries of workers. 
The classical view starts from the basics; supply equals demand in the market of goods, i.e.: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 
Where y is the output in logs, m being money supply and p the price index in logs.  
At the same time, firms produce with a linear technology such that: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡 
                                                 
2 Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), pag 449 
3 Blanchard, Amighini, Giavazzi, “Macroeconomia, una prospettiva europea”, 2010, page 176 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
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Where α is the productivity parameter and l employment in logs. Moreover, it set prices 
according to the following mark-up rule: 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 − 𝛼𝑡 + 𝑋 
Where w is the nominal wage in logs and 𝑋 is increasing in the market power of firms. 
Labour supply (in logs) is then an increasing function of real wages: 
𝑙𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑙 ̅ + 𝑛(𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡) 
Using 4 and 5 and doing some algebra it is obtained the equation describing the equilibrium 
level of employment: 
𝑙𝑡
∗ = 𝑙 ̅ + 𝜂(𝛼𝑡 − 𝑥) 
Using (2) and (3) the equilibrium in the goods market determines p* given l*: 
𝑝𝑡
∗ = 𝑚𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡
∗ − 𝛼𝑡 
This model has some implications:  
1. A positive demand shock increases prices, while l* is determined by the fundamentals 
of the economy. Money is neutral; 
2. A positive productivity shock increases wages and employment by reducing prices; 
3. Market power reduces output and prices; 
… And some limits: 
4. Unemployment can only be voluntary; 
5. Compared to real data, the model predicts too much volatility in wages, in particular 
given productivity shocks; 
6. Changes in aggregate demand have no real effects, and this is not consistent with the 
data; 
Accounting for these limits, the model makes a step further. Nickell (1998) presents a simple 
unemployment macro model, starting from the fact that two equations are common to almost 
all macro models of unemployment: Aggregate demand and aggregate production 
𝑦 = 𝜎1(𝑥𝑛 − 𝑝) + 𝜎2𝑥𝑟 
𝑢 = −𝑤𝑦 
Where 𝑦 is Real GDP, 𝑥𝑛 account for exogenous nominal demand factors and 𝑥𝑟 exogenous 
real demand factors, p is the GDP deflator, u the unemployment rate. Government policy 
affects the x parameters.  
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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It is then assumed that pricing is based on a mark-up model: 
𝑝 − 𝑤 = 𝑧𝑝 − 𝛽2(𝑝 − 𝑝
ⅇ) 
Where w is the wage and z are exogenous factors influencing the mark-up. 𝛽2 captures price 
stickiness. Here demand effects on price setting are not accounted for (conclusions will not be 
affected).  
The wage setting is then described with: 
𝑤 =  𝛾2𝑝
ⅇ + (1 − 𝛾2)𝑝 −  𝛾1 ln 𝑢 −  𝛾11∆ ln 𝑢 + 𝑧𝑤 
Where wages are assumed to be set as a mark-up on actual and expected prices, influenced by 
the state of the economy, represented with log of unemployment rate and log of its growth 
rate; 𝑧𝑤 is the vector of all exogenous wage pressure factors. 
𝛾1 is the long run unemployment elasticity and it depends on labour market institutions and 
other peculiarities of the economy. 
𝛾2 measures how much wages are sticky, i.e. how much they depend on expected prices. With 
perfect indexation, 𝛾2 = 0. 
Assuming unanticipated shocks on demand, prices and wages, i.e.: 
𝑥𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛−1 + 𝜀𝑛  𝑥𝑟 = ?̅?𝑟 + 𝜀𝑟  𝑧𝑝 = 𝑧?̅? + 𝜀𝑃  𝑧𝑤 = 𝑧?̅? + 𝜀𝑤 
The result is the reduced form of unemployment equation under rational expectations: 
ln 𝑢 =
𝛾11
𝛾
ln 𝑢−1 +
𝑧?̅? + 𝑧?̅?
𝛾
−
𝑤1𝛼2
𝛼2 + 𝑤1𝛾
(𝜖𝑛 +
𝜎2
𝜎1
𝜖𝑟) +
𝑤1
𝛼2 + 𝑤1𝛾
(𝜖𝑝 + 𝜖𝑤) 
Where 𝛾 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾11 ,   𝛼 = 𝛽2 +  𝛾2 ,   𝑤 =
𝑤𝜎1
𝑢
  with u average unemployment. 
Note that the model implies an unemployment-inflation trade off of the form: 
ln 𝑢 =
𝛾11
𝛾1
ln 𝑢−1 +
𝑧?̅? + 𝑧?̅?
𝛾
−
𝛼2
𝛾
∆2𝑝  
From this model, we learn that: 
1. Unemployment is determined by demand factors; 
2. Labour market institutions influences the parameters of the model. They might differ 
across time and countries; 
3. If unemployment does not affect wages in the long run (γ1=0), equation 12 is 
transformed in a Random Walk, i.e. external shocks have permanent effects on the 
level of unemployment and there is not return to the original equilibrium (hysteresis 
hypothesis). Empirical evidences differ across countries and show the possible 
presence of Unit Roots in many European nations, while there is no evidence in the 
United States (see section1, chapter 3); 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
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4. If γ1>0, on the other hands, shocks (positive or negative), will not have permanent 
effects, unless they permanently change some of the parameters in the equation; 
With respect to the inflation-unemployment trade-off, new evidences have been collected, 
analysed and presented in the ECB Forum of Central Banking in 2015. 
In the middle of the XX century, it was consolidated a strong, negative, relationship between 
inflation and unemployment (the Philipp’s Curve) that inspired the economic policies of 
developed countries for many years during the 50s and 60s. However, starting from the oil 
crisis in the 70s (and the stagflation phenomenon) this relation became weaker and weaker in 
the following years, stabilising from the mid-90s to today at a level close to zero, but 
statistically significant [Blanchard, Cerutti and Summers, 2015]. 
These authors confirm an earlier IMF study (IMF’s April 2013 W.E.O.) which shows that 
since the mid-70s short-run inflation expectation have become more stable and that the 
Philipp’s Curve flattened. 
The main explanation of this phenomena proposed by Blanchard, Cerutti and Summers is that 
it changed the way people form expectation of inflation. The “inflation targeting” approach 
implemented by Central Banks led to less weight on past inflation levels and more on 
perceived target, making move the Philipp’s Curve from an “accelerating” one to a “level” 
one. 
Chart 1 (Data Source: OECD, 2017) 
 
Does this mean that the monetary policy conducted by Central Banks, i.e. inflation targeting, 
is not necessary anymore or need to change its goals? No, it doesn’t. According to the paper 
previously mentioned, the relationship between inflation and unemployment is still present 
and statistically significant, and Central Banks are doing their job managing it. What is really 
needed, then, are structural reforms working on the supply side of the economy.  
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During his speech at the ECB forum on Central Banking in Sintra, 2015, ECB President 
Mario Draghi clearly defines what are structural reforms in his view: 
“Structural reforms are, in my view, best defined as policies that permanently and positively 
alter the supply-side of the economy. This means that they have two key effects. 
First, they lift the path of potential output, either by raising the inputs to production – the 
supply and quality of labour and the amount of capital per worker – or by ensuring that those 
inputs are used more efficiently, i.e. by raising total factor productivity (TFP). Second, they 
make economies more resilient to economic shocks by facilitating price and wage flexibility 
and the swift reallocation of resources within and across sectors.” 
Indeed, structural reforms become particularly important in a Monetary Union, where the 
Central Bank cannot respond to single-country issues which have to be solved by government 
intervention first at Union level, through the implementation of reforms that will lead to 
convergence of the underlying economies, and second at country level, receiving the Union 
directives and facing the distinctive characteristics of the national economy.
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1.B European Labour Market: Some Descriptive Statistics 
General Overview 
The labour market is the supply of people in a particular country or area who are able and 
willing to work4. Every economic area, from union to regional level, has its own 
characteristics: Different age of the population, different level (and quality) of education, 
different business specializations (services, manufacturing…) and so on. All these features 
shape social and economic conditions. Even while moving toward a process of unionization, 
differences will always be present and will always need to be managed to improve the 
economic and social environment in which a Union operates. 
The European labour market makes no exception. Through this chapter it will be illustrated 
via tables and maps what is the current EU situation and how it evolved since the introduction 
of the Euro currency, focusing on some key parameters of the labour market (GDP, 
employment and unemployment rates, education…), both at Union, National and Regional 
Level. A deeper investigation of the labour market institutions is left instead to Section 2, 
where it will be analysed how international organizations measure the level of regulation of 
each State and how these measures can be used to assess institutions’ role in the 
unemployment behaviour. 
The period analysed goes mostly from 2000 to 2016. The study is split in four main years: 
2000 as the starting point (introduction of the Euro and starting date of plenty of statistics on 
Eurostat, source of the data); 2008 as the peak level of the EU economy; 2013 as the bottom 
point and 2016 as the last available data to describe the current situation.  
The first focus is on aggregate data at European level (EU-27/28), in particular on the 
employment structure (age and sectorial composition), with some insights on the current 
NUTS 2 distribution of these characteristics to emphasise the variability that would otherwise 
be lost analysing the data at Union and country level;  
The chapter then continues with a deeper analysis on the unemployment level in Europe at 
Country and NUTS 2 level, comparing its key features with the ones of the United States of 
America and its Federal States. This focus will be the incipit to introduce the hysteresis 
hypothesis in the unemployment rate, i.e. the fundamental theoretical background behind the 
relationship between labour market institutions and unemployment level and growth in an 
economy. 
  
                                                 
4 Cambridge Dictionary 
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Table 1 reports some of the statistics anticipated above: it is tangible an improvement in all of 
them from 2000 to 2016, except for young unemployment, which is still higher than its 
starting level even though it is well below the top reached in 2013. However, looking at data 
from 2008 it is evident that the recovery process is still not complete since all the parameters 
are worst off their 2008 levels, except for secondary education and GDP per capita (at 
purchase power standards). 
The bottom part of the table shows how the variability across countries and NUTS 2 regions 
of the variables changed in these 16 years. Even though parameters look better today than in 
2000, variability (measured as standard deviation) increased for all of them. From this point 
of view, a lot of work is still needed to make the underlying economies of the Union to 
converge to an optimal level. The maps below show the current situation for some of the 
variables described.  
Table 1 & Charts 2-3 (Data Source: Eurostat, 2017) 
Stats  
EU -27* 
Part. Rate 
15-24 
Unmp 
Rate 
Tot. 
Unmp 
Rate 
Long 
Term 
Unmp 
Tot. 
Emp 
Rate 
Pop. 
With 
Sec. 
Edu  
Temp. 
Contr.  
GDP  
Per 
Capita 
PPS (€) 
2000 68.54% 18.30% 9.00% 4.28% 62.10% 64.40% 9.50% 19.800 
2008 70.71% 15.70% 6.70% 2.63% 65.70% 71.40% 10.90% 26.100 
2013 72.00% 23.60% 10.60% 5.20% 64.10% 75.10% 10.70% 26.700 
2016 72.97% 18.60% 8.30% 4.05% 66.70% 76.90% 11.20% 28.900 
Stdev 
2000  Country 
Level 
6.3% 9.3% 4.4% 2.7% 7.8% 16.57% 4.27% n.a. 
Stdev 
2016  
5.8% 9.0% 4.0% 2.9% 7.0% 12.99% 4.97% n.a. 
Stdev 
2000  NUTS 2 
Level 
6.3% 12.4% 5.4% 3.5% 8.4% 16.83% n.a. n.a. 
Stdev 
2016  
8.0% 13.1% 5.9% 4.3% 9.9% 17.59% n.a. n.a. 
*Source: Eurostat. Data refers to EU-27 aggregate except for GDP that refers to EU-28. GDP of 2016 is not 
available, the one reported is referred to 2015 
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In table 2 are reported statistics related to the employment structure by age in Europe.  
Divergence is high at extreme age cohorts (15-24 and 55-64), where employment rate is lower 
and apparently “weaker”, i.e. more sensible to crisis and shocks with respect to “core” ages. 
Differences move following a north-south axis as in the statistics presented above (see map 
charts). 
Looking at the sectorial structure (table 3 and charts 6-7), on the other hand, it is possible to 
notice an east-west axis: eastern countries economy relies more on the industrial and 
manufacturing sectors while more advanced economies in the west have a solid tertiary sector 
(some of the results below might seem odds talking about tertiary sector, for example Sicilia 
and Lazio. This is because public administration and tourism is included in the computation 
of the tertiary sector quota, and in these regions they constitute an important part of the 
economy). 
Table 2 & Charts 4-5 (Data Source: Eurostat, 2017) 
Stats  
EU -27* 
Emp. 
15-24 
Emp.  
25-34 
Emp. 
35_44 
Emp.  
45-54 
Emp.  
55-64 
Emp.  
15-64 
2000 37.10% 75.30% 79.00% 73.30% 36.80% 62.10% 
2008 37.20% 77.90% 81.90% 78.30% 45.50% 65.70% 
2013 32.20% 73.60% 79.20% 77.50% 50.20% 64.10% 
2016 33.80% 75.70% 80.90% 79.40% 55.40% 66.70% 
Stdev 
2000  
Country 
Level 
14.82% 6.51% 6.54% 7.93% 15.48% 8.34% 
Stdev 
2016  
Country 
Level 
15.14% 6.96% 5.39% 7.84% 12.45% 7.66% 
Stdev 
2000  
NUTS 2 
Level 
14.28% 8.43% 6.82% 8.17% 12.77% 8.37% 
Stdev 
2016  
NUTS 2 
Level 
15.11% 10.39% 8.75% 10.74% 12.41% 9.85% 
*Source: Eurostat. Data refers to EU-27 aggregate 
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Table 3 & Charts 6-7 (Data Source: Eurostat, 2017) 
Stats EU -27* Agr. Quota Ind. Quota Serv. Quota 
2000 7.11% 29.79% 63.10% 
2008 5.62% 33.30% 61.08% 
2013 5.44% 30.09% 64.46% 
2016 4.93% 29.94% 65.13% 
Stdev 
2000  
Country 
Level 
7.37% 5.35% 9.09% 
Stdev 
2016  
Country 
Level 
4.53% 6.49% 5.32% 
Stdev 
2000  
NUTS 2 
Level 
9.06% 7.55% 10.47% 
Stdev 
2016  
NUTS 2 
Level 
8.87% 7.90% 7.51% 
*Source: Eurostat. Data refers to EU-27 aggregate 
 
This might say that while economic recovery is helping the European Continent to better deal 
with its problems, there are still issues to face up at a regional level, issues that cannot be 
underestimated by European and country governments only because the recovery process is 
pushing the economy to pre-crisis levels. 
Indeed, convergence in economic fundamentals should be the main goal of policy makers in 
the Eurozone. The maps presented show that Europe is still far from this goal, even at a 
country level. Examples of Italy and Spain show high divergence within country, while 
Germany and Nordic countries show high divergence with respect the Southern ones. 
Unemployment makes no exception. 
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Unemployment Focus 
Focusing on unemployment, Europe still assists to a huge variability across States and across 
Regions (at NUTS2 level), as clearly visible in charts 8 and 9. 
Charts 8-9 (Data Source: Eurostat, 2017) 
  
It is here evident a net difference between Southern (Portugal, Italy, Spain…) and Northern 
(Germany, Norway, Denmark…) Europe, with the first group of countries experiencing high 
and persistent levels of unemployment while the latter group shows low levels of people 
without a job. France seems to belong more to the group of Mediterranean countries rather 
than the Nordic ones. 
The situation, conversely, looked to some extents quite different in 2008, right before the 
financial crisis hit the world. 
Germany had a much higher unemployment level compared for example to Northern Italy, 
that had a level analogous to United Kingdom or Denmark. However, depressed regions were 
already experiencing high unemployment (Southern Italy and Spain, Portugal, Greece…), 
and, apparently, they “influenced” their neighbours during the financial crisis, showing that 
the problem was likely not only at a regional-level but also at a country-level. 
Charts 10, 11 and 12 below and some descriptive statistics (table A1 and A2 in the appendix) 
show that a convergence process was likely happening during the positive business cycle 
experienced between 2000 and 2007, where unemployment was lowering and converging to a 
common level across all Europe, looking in this way more similar to the United States, which 
become the natural comparable of an economic union. However, with the spread of the crisis, 
the convergence process blew up and disparities across European countries increased to new 
maximums. 
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Charts 10 & 11 (Data Source: Eurostat and FRED, 2017) 
 
Chart 12 (Data Source: Eurostat and FRED, 2017) 
 
Chart 12 shows the standard deviation across the unemployment level of 30 States in Europe 
and 51 Federal States in US. The higher the standard deviation, the higher the disparities.  
It is here clearly visible how the financial crisis in 2008 strongly increased unemployment 
gaps across European States and how the sovereign debt crisis in 2011 gave a fatal hit to the 
recovery attempts of the European Union. Moreover, the recovery process that seems to start 
in 2013 shows a much slower downward path than the one experienced in the pre-crisis 
period. This phenomenon is even more evident analysing NUTS2 data. 
Chart 13 and 14 (Data Source: Eurostat, 2017) 
 
These evidences show how much work is still needed in Europe to create a better Union, at 
least talking about job creation. 
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The key point is to understand how advanced economies as the one of United States and 
Europe have such a big difference in the behaviour of their Unemployment rate.  
This is a well-recognised issue that has been studied in the economic literature, as presented 
before, at least since the ‘80s with Blanchard and Summers as pioneers publishing the first 
paper about hysteresis. A simple chart immediately displays it: While European 
unemployment (Italy and France are taken as examples given the early start date chosen) 
shows a non-stationarity component, the US one seems to follow a mean reverting process. 
Chart 15 (Source: OECD, 2017) 
 
Indeed, oversea unemployment seems to react to shocks increasing sharply its level but 
moving back quickly to a “natural” level. On the other hand, European countries, here 
exemplified with Italy and France, have more difficulties and the recovery path appears much 
slower. This seems to corroborate the existence of a non-stationary component, i.e. the 
presence of a Unit Root.  
Among many, in a paper published in 2015, Jordi Galì5 analyses three possible causes of a 
Unit Root (i.e. non-stationarity) in European unemployment: 
1. The Natural Rate Hypothesis: The Unemployment Natural Rate is the equilibrium rate 
that makes the salaries chosen in the “salaries determination” equation equal to the 
salaries derived from the “price fixation equation”. The hypothesis is that the non-
stationary component derives from an exogenous permanent effect in the Natural Rate; 
2. The long-run trade off Hypothesis: The long run trade off refers to a consolidate 
relationship between inflation and unemployment levels. The non-stationary 
component derives from the presence of a Unit Root in wage inflation; 
3. The hysteresis Hypothesis: Hysteresis means that shocks have permanent effects on 
the level of unemployment, i.e. there is not a natural rate to which the economy 
                                                 
5 Director of the Center for Research in International Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
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converges. The non-stationary component derives from the institutional framework in 
which firms and workers operate (insider-outsider model); 
Galì conclusions are that the first hypothesis provides little evidence to be behind the unit root 
in unemployment, and the second can account for it only when the data sample is the one of 
the disinflationary period of the ‘70s and ’80s, but not in the more recent past. 
The hysteresis hypothesis, on the other hand, might have potential to explain the non-
stationary behaviour of Unemployment in Europe.  
In the next chapter it will be verified the effective presence of a Unit Root in 13 European 
Countries (the ones with more history available, at least from 1990) first with panel data 
techniques and then with time series single country tests. United States are again taken as 
benchmark, given the large amount of literature that shows their unemployment stationarity. 
Once this is verified, the framework will focus on labour market institutions of European 
Countries, to study the effects they have on unemployment by age (young unemployment, 15-
24 years old, total unemployment, 20-64 years old, and long-term unemployment) using the 
EPL indicator developed by the OECD and regional data. 
The analysis will then make a step further utilizing sectorial data on employment level to 
better understand how employment protection legislation impacts on different economic 
structures; This might be of help to better suit economic policies according to the economy 
peculiarities in which the legislator is operating.  
  
17 
 
1.C  Unit Roots: Evidences in Europe 
As pointed out earlier, charts show a structural difference of the unemployment behaviour in 
different countries. In particular, while the US unemployment level seems to revert quickly to 
a “natural” rate after a negative shock, the European countries show difficulties in returning to 
pre-shock levels, and when a recovery process starts it is usually slower that the one it is 
observed in North America. 
These different paths are known in statistics as stationary and non-stationary processes.  
A stationary time series is a series whose statistical properties such as mean, variance, 
autocorrelation… are all constant over time. It shows a mean reverting behaviour fluctuating 
around the mean as it always tends to go back to it. This is consistent with a “natural rate 
hypothesis”, i.e. the idea of a permanent optimal rate to which unemployment always 
converges. 
A process in which shocks have permanent effects is instead non-stationary, and it is also said 
a Unit Root process. This is consistent with the “hysteresis hypothesis” presented in the 
previous chapter. 
Some argue that researchers must be careful not to confuse a Unit Root process with a 
stationary process that shows persistence: in this latter case, it is still possible to observe the 
process reverting to pre-shocks levels, but following a much slower path. It can be seen as a 
“near Unit Root” process [León-Ledesma, Miguel A., 2000]. 
While this might seem an issue, the difference between persistence and non-stationarity is 
subtle and it might lose of significance from an economic policy point of view. Even a 
persistent (but stationary) process might have the same “real” effects in the economy as a 
hysteric one, in particular from a political perspective.  
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that both persistence and hysteresis are issues to consider at 
the same level when dealing with unemployment and labour market regulation.  
In any case, the tests proposed in the next paragraph will substantially not reject the 
hypothesis of non-stationarity in many of the countries analysed, and in the time series 
approach the empirical framework will account for “close to unity” problem of the Dickey 
Fuller test. 
The Unit Root testing proceeds then both with a panel data approach, using Levin-Lin-Chu 
Test and Pesaran Test, and a time series approach with a DickeyFuller-GLS test. Both 
approaches confirm the existence of non-stationarity in the sample analysed: thirteen 
European countries chosen according to the availability of long time-series and the 
importance of their economy in Europe. 
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Panel Data Unit Root Test 
Unit Root testing using Panel techniques is an evolution from time series unit root tests.  
Pioneers of this are Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). They start from the fact that in finite samples, 
unit root test procedures are known to have limited power against alternative hypotheses with 
highly persistent deviations from equilibrium. They then consider pooling cross-section time 
series data as a means of generating more powerful unit root tests. 
A panel unit root test considers both the asymptotic behaviour of the T dimension and the 
cross-sectional dimension N of the panel. There are three possibilities to handle this, and the 
tests used will focus on the sequential limit theory, where N (the number of countries in the 
panel) is fixed and T is allowed to go to infinity [Kunst, Nell, Zimmermann, 2011]. 
It is first performed a Levin-Lin-Chu Test to both young unemployment (15 to 24 years old 
people) and total unemployment (20 to 64 years old people). The LLC test has the following 
hypothesis: 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots 
H1: Panels are stationary 
For thirteen European countries, using monthly data from January 1991 to December 2016, it 
is rejected the null of Unit Roots at the 5% level for total unemployment (p-value = 0.0238) 
but it cannot be rejected even at 10% for young unemployment (p-value = 0.2093).  
The test allowed the subtraction of cross-sectional mean (as suggested by the test authors), it 
did not include a trend, and it used a number of lags equal to 6 for the ADF test after 
performing ADF tests to all the single series, and finding it as the best lag for many of them6. 
However, the LLC test suffers of some drawbacks [Kunst, Nell, Zimmermann, 2011]:  
1. The null hypothesis is very restrictive, stating that all panels have a unit root; 
2. The test strongly relies on cross-sectional independence. However, testing the panel 
for it, it cannot be accepted this assumption; It will then be performed a more 
appropriate test developed by Pesaran in 2007; 
3. According to the authors, the test works well with panel with N between 10 and 250 
and T between 5 and 250. The panel utilized has N=13 and T = 312. It might be too 
long in terms of T. With so extended time series, though, it should be possible to 
safely run time series test for Unit Roots. In this specific case, it will be applied a 
variant of the Dickey Fuller Test, the DF-GLS test. 
Going on with the panel data procedure, the panel is first tested for cross-sectional 
independence using the Pesaran (2004) C-D test for cross-section independence in macro 
                                                 
6 Following the methodology proposed by Schwert (1989) 
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panel data. As expected, the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence is rejected at the 
1% level both for young and total unemployment. Then, a test that allows for cross-sectional 
dependence is performed [Pesaran, 2007].  
Results are now identifying a Unit Root: the null of non-stationarity cannot be rejected. 
To check the robustness of these findings, the procedure is repeated for the (total) 
unemployment rate of 50 US States in the same period and with the same frequency of data 
(monthly). In the American case, LLC test rejects the null of non-stationarity as in the 
European case, and after controlling for cross-sectional independence, which exists also in 
this panel, also the Pesaran Test rejects the null of a Unit Root in the series.  
It seems then evident a statistical difference in the behaviour of European and American 
unemployment. 
Time series Unit Root test 
The most common way to test for a Unit Root in time series analysis is through the Dickey-
Fuller Test, or its augmented version (ADF test), which accounts for serially correlated errors. 
However, even this test suffers of some drawbacks: it has little power w.r.t. the alternative 
when there is a deterministic trend and Φ is near to 1, i.e. it has small probability to reject the 
null hypothesis of a unit root when the null hypothesis is false [Kirchgassner G., Wolters J., 
2000]. 
Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock developed a variant of the ADF (Efficient tests for an 
autoregressive unit root, Econometrica, 1996), called DF-GLS test, to account for these 
issues. 
The examination will directly rely on this methodology to better deal also with the hysteresis-
persistence issue described above. 
Again, the analysis is computed first on 13 European Countries, with US as comparable, and 
then it is checked the robustness using US States. The power of the test should be granted by 
the large T available (312 observations for each time series). Results for European Countries 
are presented in table 4 and 5, both for total and young unemployment. 
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Table 4 (Source: Eurostat, 2017 – own computations) 
Total Unemployment (20 - 64 years old) 
Country 
Optimal 
Lag 
T-Stat 
1% Crit. 
Value 
5% Crit. 
Value 
10% Crit. 
Value 
BE 9 -1.548 -2.580 -1.978 -1.663 
FR 11 -1.209 -2.580 -1.971 -1.656 
DK 12 -1.367 -2.580 -1.967 -1.653 
DE 13 -1.184 -2.580 -1.963 -1.649 
IE 14 -1.297 -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
ES 11 -2.368** -2.580 -1.971 -1.656 
IT 12 -1.254 -2.580 -1.967 -1.653 
NL 9 -3.103*** -2.580 -1.978 -1.663 
PT 4 -0.707 -2.580 -1.995 -1.679 
FI 9 -1.826* -2.580 -1.978 -1.663 
SE 11 -0.978 -2.580 -1.971 -1.656 
UK 12 -1.409 -2.580 -1.967 -1.653 
NO 7 -0.835 -2.580 -1.985 -1.670 
US 12 -2.310** -2.580 -1.967 -1.653 
 
Table 5 (Source: Eurostat, 2017 – own computations) 
Young Unemployment (15 – 24 years old) 
Country 
Optimal 
Lag 
T-Stat 
1% Crit. 
Value 
5% Crit. 
Value 
10% Crit. 
Value 
BE 3 -0.997 -2.580 -1.998 -1.682 
FR 15 -0.534 -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
DK 14 -1.294 -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
DE 15 -1.049 -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
IE 10 -1.761* -2.580 -1.974 -1.660 
ES 9 -1.855* -2.580 -1.978 -1.663 
IT 11 -0.614 -2.580 -1.971 -1.656 
NL 10 -2.413** -2.580 -1.974 -1.660 
PT 15 -0.918 -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
FI 11 -1.682* -2.580 -1.971 -1.656 
SE 11 -0.847 -2.58 -1.971 -1.656 
UK 12 -1.280 -2.58 -1.967 -1.653 
NO 13 -1.004 -2.58 -1.963 -1.649 
US 11 -2.315** -2.58 -1.971 -1.656 
 
The null hypothesis of the test is the existence of a Unit Root. This hypothesis is rejected 
when the t-statistic is lower than the indicated critical value (critical values obtained by the 
test’s authors using montecarlo simulations). The Optimal lag is chosen using the Ng-Perron 
seq t criteria [Ng S., Perron P., 2001]. 
According to these results, it cannot be rejected the null of a Unit Root at 5% level in 11 
countries over 13 with respect to total unemployment (Netherlands, and surprisingly Spain, do 
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not show non-stationarity), and only in Netherlands for young unemployment. In US, on the 
other hand, in both cases the series is stationary. 
Repeating the analysis for US Federal States, they show the opposite behaviour (table A3 in 
the appendix). More than a half of US States reject the hypothesis of a Unit Root at a 5% level 
or lower, and 35/50 (70%) considering a confidence level of 10%. 
Analysis summary 
So far, results seem to be striking. A Unit Root is common in European Countries while it is 
much more sporadic in US States, where more than 70% of the Federal States have 
unemployment showing a mean-reverting behaviour. 
There could be many explanations of this significant difference in unemployment trend on the 
two Economic Areas, but one of the most debated is the institutional environment in which 
economic agents operate, in particular how the labour market is regulated. 
In the next section is presented a summary framework about labour market institutions across 
Europe, at least the major countries, and the indexes developed by OECD and the Fraser 
Institute to track the development of labour market regulation in the World.
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Section 2: Labour Market Regulation Overview 
2.A Introduction: Labour Market Regulation Indexes 
As previously mentioned, discussing hysteresis in the labour market implies discussing how 
institutions, through legislation, influence the interaction between firms and workers in the 
economic activity. 
Regulation of the labour market might affect unemployment in many ways: generous 
insurance against unemployment might reduce the job search efforts, while employment 
protection might have mixed effects, reducing the increase in unemployment during economic 
turmoil but decreasing the flows of workers through the labour market during economic 
recovery periods [Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000]. 
It is not an easy task to measure the differences in labour market regulations in different 
countries and how reforms effectively change the status quo in favour of a more flexible or 
rigid Employment Protection Legislation (EPL).  
The topic is a pillar of economic policy since the 80s, and for this reason employment 
protection indicators gained more and more attention during the years, since they are 
fundamental tools to use in empirical analysis to assess EPL role in shaping the labour 
market.  
The most recognised provider of time series EPL indexes is the OECD with its indicators of 
regular and temporary contracts legislation and the rules governing collective dismissals. 
Other academic and international institutions produce their own indicators, even though there 
are some drawbacks in the way they are computed, as it will be pointed out later in this 
chapter. The purpose of this work is not to make a comparison across indicators’ providers. 
However, it will be proposed the same model using both the OECD Index, the indicator the 
analysis relies on, and the Fraser Institute Labour Market Regulation Index (LMR), chosen 
among others given the extensiveness of data available and the possibility to use its sub-
components to “customize” the broad index. 
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2.B OECD EPL Indexes in Europe 
The OECD defines its indicators as a measure of the procedures and costs involved in 
dismissing individuals or groups of workers, or hiring individuals with regulars or temporary 
contracts. The indicators are computed using statutory laws. Collective bargaining agreements 
and case law, as well as advice and contributions from country-experts7. 
Employment Protection usually regards the laws regulating the dismissal of one or more 
employees: it states when it is possible to fire a person or a group of people and which is the 
correct procedure to adopt and the sanctions applied in case of breach of these provisions. 
With respect to regular contracts (EPR), procedures included in the index concern the 
notification, the delay involved before notice can start, the length of the notice period and the 
severance pay. Application of the law and sanctions are measured through the definition of 
justified or unfair dismissal (every country has its own), length of trial period, compensation 
or possibility of reinstatement following unfair dismissal. 
Collective dismissal (EPC) is instead measured looking through the definition of collective 
dismissal at State level, notification and delays involved in case of collective dismissal and 
other targeted regulation employers must respect in this particular case. 
Fixed term contracts (EPT) strictness depends on how long and how many times a person can 
be employed with a temporary contract and which kind of jobs can legally employ people on 
a temporary basis8. 
In the OECD Outlook on Employment of 2004 the full computational methodology is 
reported. The Indexes can take values from 0 (most flexible) to 6 (strictest). The 
comprehensive index is computed following the procedure illustrated by Bassanini and 
Nunziata (2009): 
𝐸𝑃𝐿 = (
5
12
) ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝑅 + (
5
12
) ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝑇 + (
2
12
) ∗ 𝐸𝑃𝐶 
In Europe the role of institutions in the labour market is usually considered massive, lead by 
the importance the Welfare State acquired in the past decades in the European economy. The 
OECD Index confirms this thought assigning an overall value of 2.15 on the simple average 
of 18 European countries (the ones with data available in the overall period of the analysis) 
against the OECD average9 of 2.05. For a further comparison, the US the index has a value of 
0.69, the lowest level in the OECD sample. 
                                                 
7 http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
8 www.oecd.org/employment/protection 
9 Which comprises European countries 
(14) 
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According to data from 2013 (the most recent available), Mediterranean countries are the ones 
with the highest level of EPL, together with Norway and Belgium. The component that 
mainly differs across legislations is the temporary contracts one, that mostly leads the 
differences across countries’ levels.  
Chart 16 (Source: OECD, 2017) 
 
Providing a percentile distribution of the evolution of the EPL Index in Europe, it can be 
noticed that, over time, changes happened in countries with a high level of employment 
protection (90th percentile) while in median and low-level countries it stayed stable. This 
might seem a (small) convergence process delivering a uniform level of labour market 
regulation in the European Union. 
Chart 17 (Source: OECD, 2017) 
 
For the countries with data available from 2000 to 2013, the chart below shows how the three 
different components changed in the last decade. 
Countries that experienced the strongest increase in flexibility are the Mediterranean ones, as 
Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, mostly through liberalization of the temporary work labour 
market. Portugal is quite an outlier since it strongly deregulated also regular contracts 
legislation, uncommon practice across the other countries (event though after 2015 also other 
States are changing fundamental rules of regular contracts, as it will be described ahead in this 
section). 
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Also, this chart evidences an overall trend of reduction of the strictness of employment 
protection, even though there are some exceptions (Poland, Ireland, Hungary…) while some 
countries did not make any change at all. 
Chart 18 (Source: OECD, 2017) 
 
In general, the situation in Europe seems going in the direction of a partial increase in the 
labour market flexibility, in particular in the segment of temporary contracts. However, the 
low regulative level of the United States is still far away.  
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2.C Fraser Institute Indexes in Europe 
The Fraser Institute is a Canadian think tank founded in 1974 by Michael Walker10. Its motto 
is “if it matters, measure it”, so its mission is to create a reliable measure (i.e. open data and 
transparent methodology) of different economic variables which are not easy to measure with 
traditional data provided by institutional databases (Eurostat, FRED, OECD…). Data are 
available complete and on an annual basis since 2002, and its indexes are largely cited in 
economic policy research11. 
These variables are summarized in 5 macro-groups: 
1. Size of Government: Expenditures, taxes and enterprises; 
2. Legal Structure and security of property rights; 
3. Access to sound Money; 
4. Freedom to trade internationally; 
5. Regulation of credit, labour and business; 
Each macro group is the arithmetic average of sub-indexes which represents more specific 
subjects of interest of the macro category. Focusing on labour market regulation, there are six 
indicators [Gwartney, Lawson, Hall, 2016]: 
‐ Hiring Regulation and Minimum Wage: This sub-component is based on the 
“Employing Workers” section of the World Bank’s Doing Business and is based on 
the following components: (1) whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for 
permanent tasks; (2) the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and 
(3) the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to the average 
value added per worker. An economy is assigned a score of 1 if fixed-term contracts 
are prohibited for permanent tasks and a score of 0 if they can be used for any task. A 
score of 1 is assigned if the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts is 
less than 3 years; 0.5 if it is 3 years or more but less than 5 years; and 0 if fixed-term 
contracts can last 5 years or more. Finally, a score of 1 is assigned if the ratio of the 
minimum wage to the average value added per worker is 0.75 or more; 0.67 for a ratio 
of 0.50 or more but less than 0.75; 0.33 for a ratio of 0.25 or more but less than 0.50; 
and 0 for a ratio of less than 0.25. 
‐ Hiring and Firing Regulation: This sub-component is based on the Global 
Competitiveness Report question (World Economic Forum): “The hiring and firing of 
workers is impeded by regulations (= 1) or flexibly determined by employers (= 7)”.  
                                                 
10 https://www.fraserinstitute.org/about 
11 https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/economic-freedom-research-professional-citations-2014.pdf 
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‐ Centralized Collective Bargaining: This sub-component is based on the Global 
Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum) question: “Wages in your country 
are set by a centralized bargaining process (= 1) or up to each individual company (= 
7)”.  
‐ Hours Regulations: This sub-component is based on the “Rigidity of Hours Index” in 
the World Bank’s Doing Business, and is based on the following five components: (1) 
whether there are restrictions on night work; (2) whether there are restrictions on 
holiday work; (3) whether the length of the work week can be 5.5 days or longer; (4) 
whether there are restrictions on overtime work; and (5) whether the average paid 
annual leave is 21 working days or more. For each question, when the regulations 
apply, a score of 1 is given. If there are no restrictions, the economy receives a score 
of 0. The zero-to-10 rating is based on how many of these regulations are in place: 0 
regulations results in a rating of 10; 1 regulation results in a rating of 8; and so on. 
‐ Mandated cost of worker dismissal: This sub-component is based on the World Bank’s 
Doing Business data on the cost of the advance notice requirements, severance 
payments and penalties due when dismissing a redundant worker with 10 years tenure. 
The formula used to calculate the zero-to-10 ratings was: (Vmax − Vi ) / (Vmax − 
Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi represents the dismissal cost (measured in weeks of 
wages). The values for Vmax and Vmin were set at 58 weeks (1.5 standard deviations 
above average in 2005) and 0 weeks, respectively. Countries with values outside the 
Vmax and Vmin range received ratings of either zero or 10 accordingly. 
‐ Conscription: Data on the use and duration of the military conscription.  
The overall index is then built computing the simple average of the 6 components illustrated. 
However, there are limitations in the development of this indicator.  
A research of the International Labour Office (ILO) points some criticisms of how the Fraser 
Institute (and other organizations) compute their labour market flexibility indicator 
[Aleksynska, Cazes, 2014]. In the next paragraphs are reported the main findings of the paper 
to better understand how to use and interpret this index in the empirical framework. 
The first and main problem is the use of the Employing Workers Indicator (EWI), a sub-
indicator of the Doing Business indicator developed by the World Bank which has been 
criticised from academia and other international organizations (see Berg and Cazes, 2008, 
Lee, McCann and Torm, 2008). Independent reviews had the effect of making the bank 
modifying and excluding this indicator from the computation of the broad Ease of Doing 
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Business indicator, since its valuation of the labour market was biased towards the problems 
of employment protection, not considering its benefits [World Bank, 2009]. 
Then, the authors present other issues: 
▪ The use of some, but not all, of the sub-components of the Rigidity of Employment 
Index, without explaining why; 
▪ The EWI edition changed over time because of methodological reviews, but Fraser 
does not indicate which one it uses; 
▪ The World Bank does not use, and suggest not to use this data to rank countries, while 
Fraser still does; 
▪ There is a repetitiveness of questions in creating the sub-indicators, generating 
redundancy and over-representation of similar concepts, for example in the hours 
regulation component. The simple average used to create the LMR Index does not 
help to limit the problem, but it emphasizes it. 
The ILO research concludes that despite the problems outlined so far, the index could still be 
useful, in particular for cross-country comparison within the same year and based on 
disaggregated components. However, time-series analysis might be more problematic. For 
this reason, the empirical framework will rely on the OECD EPL Index and it will use a 
custom form of the Fraser Index to check whether there are effective differences in the 
analysis or not. 
Accounting for these evidences, this work will perform some modifications on the main 
index: 
1. Conscription is eliminated. The custom index will not rely on this parameter in the 
analysis given that it is expected more to misallocate labour rather than increase 
unemployment [Å.E. Andersson, D.E Andersson, B. Hårsman, Z. Daghbashyan, 
2014]; 
2. Hours regulation is excluded because considered redundant with the other 
components; 
3. The simple average of the remaining components is replaced using a similar weighted 
average as the one used to build the OECD Index. The regular contract component 
(epr) is computed as the simple average of Hiring and Firing and Cost of Dismissal 
indicators; Hiring Regulation and Minimum Wage accounts for the temporary 
contracts regulation (ept), and Centralized Collective Bargaining for the collective 
dismissal one (epc); 
The main index is then computed in the same way as in equation 14. 
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The higher the level of the index, the higher the flexibility of the market (Hint: opposite 
interpretation with respect the OECD Index). 
This custom form of the Fraser Index shows some similarities with the OECD Index, for 
example the low variability across countries of regular contracts regulation and, on the 
opposite, the high differences on temporary contracts legislations. 
Chart 19 (Source: Fraser Institute, 2017) 
 
From a country “ranking” perspective it can be noticed that, again, Mediterranean countries 
are the ones with the stricter labour market regulation, together with Norway, but there are 
some discrepancies with the OECD Index as reported in the table below, discrepancies 
regarding mainly Scandinavian and Eastern countries. 
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Table 6 (Source: OECD and Fraser, 2017. Highlighted the bigger discrepancies) 
Country Ranking as of 2013 (1st most flexible) 
Country 
OECD 
Rank 
Fraser Rank 
Belgium 15 5 
Denmark 6 1 
Germany 10 11 
Ireland 2 4 
Greece 11 13 
Spain 13 17 
France 17 16 
Italy 14 12 
Hungary 3 7 
Netherlands 8 9 
Austria 7 6 
Poland 9 3 
Portugal 12 10 
Finland 4 15 
Sweden 5 8 
United Kingdom 1 2 
Norway 16 14 
 
According to Fraser, changes in labour market flexibility have been quite significant for all 
the countries with high and median-level of labour market regulation in the panel. This differs 
from the OECD Index behaviour, which is much more stable over time. 
Chart 20 (Source: Fraser Institute, 2017) 
 
Analysing the single components of Fraser, other similarities with the OECD Index can be 
find, for example the biggest regular contracts increase in flexibility in Portugal, while there 
are discrepancies in particular with respect Scandinavian countries, Germany and Belgium. 
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Chart 21 (Source: Fraser Institute, 2017) 
 
To conclude, some descriptive statistics might help to better see the differences across indexes 
(reference period: 2002 – 2013). 
Table 7 (Source: OECD and Fraser, 2017) 
Index Mean StDev Min Max 
OECD (Epr) 2.31 0.62 1.09 4.58 
OECD (Ept) 1.72 1.08 0.25 4.75 
OECD (Epc) 3.28 0.66 1.63 5.13 
OECD (Broad) 2.23  0.64 1.05 3.69 
Fraser (min_wage) 6.42 2.37 2.2 10 
Fraser (hir&fir) 3.69 1.29 1.33 8.51 
Fraser (cost_dism) 7.68 2.06 1.01 10 
Fraser (coll_barg) 5.31 1.86 1.83 8.37 
Fraser (Official) 6.18     1.34 3.34 8.48 
Fraser (Custom) 5.93 1.48 2.86 8.90 
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2.D Indexes and Economic Policies: Some examples 
So far it has been described how these indexes try to measure reality. However, it might be 
difficult to interpret how these numbers change over time, i.e. how economic policy can 
effectively change their value. The question becomes: which reforms did contribute to 
significant changes in the index value and at the same time caused real changes in the labour 
market of a country?  
A comprehensive study of the indexes computation over time is behind the scope of this 
work, but the next paragraphs will try to provide some examples focusing on three countries 
labour market reforms: Italy, Germany and France12. With respect to the first two countries 
the examples taken try to identify which has been the institutional innovation that brought a 
consistent change in the indexes in the first years of 2000s. Talking about France, on the other 
hand, it’s investigated whether there have been reforms or not, since indexes levels stayed 
basically flat in all the period considered in the analysis. 
Labour Market reforms in Italy 
Looking at the Fraser Institute Index, it can be noticed that the main driver of the flexibility 
improvement in the first years of the century for Italy has been Hiring Regulations and 
Minimum Wage, i.e. the measure of temporary contracts regulation (from 4.4 in 2002 to 6.70 
in 2004). Other indicators do not show big changes in the same period. 
Looking at the OECD Index, the trend, compared to the Fraser one, is the same: the regular 
contracts index (epr_v1) stays stable for all the available period, with only a slightly decrease 
from 2.76 to 2.68 in 2013. The same happens also for collective dismissal regulation (epc). 
The other parameter that behaves as the Fraser comparable is the temporary contracts 
regulation (ept_v1), that became more flexible in the early 2000s moving from a level of 3.25 
to 2.38 and 2.00 in 3 years. It then stays flat until the last observation. 
The main labour market reform in Italy of those years has been the “Legge Biagi” 
(n.30/2003), which improved the flexibility of the Italian labour market through the 
introduction of new contracts and the loosening of restrictions at many levels [Ichino, 2004]. 
Some examples are the introduction of contracts inspired by Anglo-Saxon legislation, like 
Staff Leasing and Job Sharing and the loosening of restrictions on part-time jobs and jobs on 
call. However, this reform did not affect the regular contracts legislation but only the 
temporary contracts one, and this is fully reflected in the indexes behaviour.  
                                                 
12 The choice, discretional, has been driven by the availability of information in English language and the 
relevance of the reforms implemented and the changes in the indexes 
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It will be interesting to see how the “Jobs Act” reform (2015) will impact on the indexes level 
for Italy (data are now updated only until 2013/14). 
Labour Market reforms in Germany 
Following the same procedure, the main drivers of the flexibility improvement in Germany 
using the Fraser index are identified in Hiring Regulations and Minimum Wage indicator 
(from 5.6 in 2002 to 6.70 in 2004) and Mandate Cost of Work Dismissal indicator (from 3.6 in 
2008 to 6.26 in 2010). 
The OECD Index, however, behaves in the same way as for Italy. Strictness of regular 
contracts regulation (level of 2.68) never changes in the period considered, in net contrast 
with the Fraser indicator comparable (cost of worker dismissal), and so it does regulation of 
collective dismissal (level of 3.63). However, temporary contracts regulation strongly 
increased its flexibility, moving from an already low level of 2.00 in 2002 to 1.50 and 1.00 in 
the following years. 
The process of reforms of the labour market in Germany started in 2002 and continued in the 
subsequent years with the Hartz reforms, which introduced, among many things, a 
deregulation of temporary employment, a cut in unemployment assistance and benefits and a 
reorganization of the Federal Labour Agency. The success in 2008-2009 during the Great 
Recession, from a labour market perspective, has been the extensive use of short time work 
and working time accounts (flexible working times, exchange of salary and working time 
employee is released from work for long periods or early retires). The introduction of these 
formulas allowed Germany to not reduce the amount of employed population reducing only 
the number of hours worked [Rinne, Zimmermann, 2012]. 
The OECD Index, then, seems to better describe the German situation. 
Labour Market reforms in France 
While Germany moved in reforming labour market and social protection aiming to reduce 
rigidities, France did not follow the same scheme, focusing more on taxing qualified labour to 
maintain its high levels of social protection. [A. Fabre, 2012]. 
The OECD Index shows an initial, little increase in the strictness of EPL for regular contracts 
in 2003, from 2.34 to 2.47, and then a second little reduction in 2009, from 2.47 to 2.38. 
Collective dismissal regulation, such as in Germany and Italy, stays fixed, at a level of 3.38 
for all the available period. So far, the behaviour of these two indicators is quite similar to the 
other two countries taken as example. However, talking about temporary contracts legislation, 
France diverges, since also this index stays stable at a level of 3.63 for all the available period, 
indicating not tangible reforms.  
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Fraser indicators behaves quite similarly. To notice, the collective bargaining power index 
moves with uncertainty around its mean (6.00) for all the pre-crisis period, and Mandate Cost 
of Work Dismissal increases in flexibility during the financial crisis period from a level of 
7.03 in 2008 to a level of 8.50 in 2010. Thus, from this perspective the two index providers 
measure reforms in different ways. 
The Sarkozy government started a series of reforms since 2007 to face the Great Recession 
[Askenazy, Erel, 2012], aiming to liberalize the labour market introducing new contracts and 
increasing the generosity of short time work, while extending at the same time forms of social 
protection (for example unemployment benefits). 
With respect the increase in flexibility, there are not evidences in the index value of OECD 
but Mandated cost of worker dismissal of Fraser seems to account for that. The OECD 
measure seems more consistent, given the comparison between the amount of part-time (or 
short-time) workers in France in the pre-crisis period, 200.000 people, and the one of 
Germany, where there were 1.2 million people employed with temporary contracts. Moreover, 
its increase to respectively 250.000 people and 1.500.000 people during the financial turmoil 
(+50.000 for France, + 300.000 for Germany) is a sign of the net difference in the use of 
temporary contracts by the two countries, difference which lies in the costs and bureaucracy 
procedures existing in the French system (until January 2012 part-time working was subject 
to official authorisation). Furthermore, in Germany its cost is born by unemployment benefit, 
while in France the employer is partly reimbursed by the State [A. Fabre, 2012]. 
The new legislature started in 2017 with president Macron largely relied on reforms of the 
labour market during the election campaign. New laws are going to be introduced and, at least 
on paper, radical changes are going to take place13. As for the jobs act in Italy, it will be 
interesting to see how this will impact on the indexes computation. 
Now that both unemployment and labour market institutions have been analysed, the next 
section will provide an empirical framework to study the relationship between these two 
variables in Europe between 2000 and 2013, using regional data of both unemployment and 
employment rates.  
 
                                                 
13http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2017-08-23/doppia-partita-macron-lavoro-
063724.shtml?uuid=AErgHOGC & http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2017-08-30/loi-travail-macron-va-
avanti-riforma-063602.shtml?uuid=AEvYggJC  
Accessed September 2017 
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Section 3: Empirical Framework 
3.A Dataset 
The empirical analysis goes through two different steps.  
First, it will be studied how institutions affect the unemployment rate at different levels: 
young and total short-term unemployment and total long-term unemployment. 
The second step focuses on how legislation impacts on different economic structures, i.e. how 
sectorial employment (agriculture, industry…) changes with different EPL. 
Both frameworks rely on a fixed effect model, to get rid of all the fixed specificities of each 
region. The usual test to decide between random and fixed effect has been computed and 
errors have been clustered since both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation have been 
spotted in the data. 
Data mainly comes from Eurostat, the only database with regional statistics for the European 
Union. Other sources of data are the OECD for employment protection and other institutional 
measures (tax wedge, union density and unemployment benefits), and Fraser, limited to its 
labour market indexes. 
This work differs from the papers presented in the introduction mainly for the use of regional 
data. The main intuitions behind it are two: 
‐ First, there is a large amount of observations despite the short time period considered 
(2000-2013) and the sporadic frequency of data (annual); 
‐ Second, and most important, it is possible to take advantage of a certain “asymmetry” 
of the data; indeed, while labour market regulation is implemented at national level, 
many regions operating inside the same institutional framework have substantially 
different unemployment rates (in particular in Mediterranean countries). Thus, the idea 
is that this variability within country and between countries might lead to more robust 
and interesting results; 
In the spirit of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), the model specification introduces a set of 
variables differentiated between “dynamic” controls and “static” controls, to account for 
changes in equilibrium and actual unemployment rate. The first are (nominal14) GDP growth 
and inflation, and they are a measure of shocks in the economy (positive or negative). 
Inflation is available only at national level and accounts for country-macroeconomic shocks, 
while GDP controls for regional ones. Both variables are associated with a negative (positive) 
                                                 
14 GDP at regional level is available only nominal or at PPS. However, the latter is not suitable to be used as a 
growth rate according to Eurostat data description 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/reg_eco10_esms.htm 
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relationship with unemployment (employment); their sign in the regressions, thus, is expected 
to be negative (positive). 
The second set of controls comprises demographic and institutional characteristics of each 
region, all at NUTS-2 level, except for Union Density, Tax Wedge and Unemployment 
Benefits (other measures of institutions influence in the labour market) which are measured at 
country level. These controls should account for structural characteristics of the regional 
economy and their impact on the structural unemployment rate. In the Appendix is provided a 
description of each variable. 
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3.B A Simple Model of Unemployment and Employment Protection 
Legislation 
The first model studies a simple linear relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
Employment Protection Legislation, measured through the OECD overall Index.  
 
𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑋 +  𝜇𝑟 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟𝑡 
 
Where Ucrt is the unemployment rate in region r of country c at time t, EPLct is the value of 
the index for a determined country at time t and β2 is the coefficient of the lagged term of 
unemployment. X is a vector of controls which includes both economic performance and 
intrinsic characteristics of each region, while μ represents the regional fixed effects and δ the 
time fixed effects. ϵ is the error. 
Table 8 below reports the preliminary results accounting for regional, country and time fixed 
effects. EPL coefficient is strongly significant and it indicates a negative relationship between 
Unemployment and Employment Protection (the higher the employment protection, the lower 
the unemployment rate). The persistence of unemployment is strong, as visible in the 
coefficient of its lagged term, and the other controls have the expected sign15. 
Table 8: Impact of EPL on total unemployment rate, 20-64 years old (2000-2013) 
Dep_Var: Unmp_Tot r1 r2 r3 
        
oecd_epl -7.31*** -1.49*** -1.20*** 
lagged_unmp    0.88***  0.93*** 
tax_wedge    0.11***  0.08** 
union_dens    0.12***  0.14*** 
unmp_ben    0.02  0.02* 
gdp_g   -0.08*** -0.09*** 
acc_cpi   -0.21*** -0.22*** 
sec_educ    0.02  0.00 
urb_proxy   -0.15*  0.00 
tech_quota   -0.04 -0.01* 
age_median   -0.39*** -0.06*** 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 3332 2632 2632 
R2 0.25 0.85 0.94 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
                                                 
15 See Appendix with controls description 
(15) 
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Results are similar if we consider as dependent variable the long-term unemployment rate (the 
unemployment rate that represents the percentage of total unemployed people seeking a job 
for longer than one year16), while their magnitude is even stronger analysing young 
unemployment level (the unemployment rate of people aged between 15 and 24 years old). 
Regressions’ outputs are reported in the Appendix (Table A4 and A5). 
How do results change using the Fraser Index instead of the OECD Index? It should first be 
recalled that this index has the opposite interpretation of the OECD EPL Index, i.e. an 
increase in the value of the index corresponds to an increase in the flexibility of the labour 
market. Obtaining the same sign in the output, then, is equal to have the opposite result. 
To start, the analysis tries to use the normal index developed by Fraser. Results are the 
opposite of above for all three unemployment measures, since the sign is negative and 
significant for all the specifications. Table A6-7-8 in the Appendix reports the regressions’ 
coefficients for total, young and long-term unemployment. 
The same happens using the custom form of the Index developed in Chapter 2.C: results are 
robust across the different specifications, but they show the opposite behaviour with respect 
the OECD Index, as reported below in Table 917.  
Table 9: Fraser Index and total unemployment rate, 20-64 years old (2002-2013) 
Dep_Var: Unmp_Tot r1 r2 r3 
        
fraser_epl -0.93* -0.62*** -0.73***   
lagged_unmp    0.92***  0.94*** 
tax_wedge    0.12***  0.10** 
union_dens    0.12**  0.14*** 
unmp_ben    0.03**  0.03** 
gdp_g   -0.09*** -0.09*** 
acc_cpi   -0.21*** -0.21*** 
sec_educ   -0.02 -0.02** 
urb_proxy   -0.20*** -0.02 
tech_quota   -0.08** -0.02*** 
age_median   -0.18* -0.04*** 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 2974 2357 2357 
R2 0.14 0.87 0.95 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
                                                 
16 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfst_r_lfu2ltu&lang=en 
17 the same sign of the Index coefficient in the regression for Fraser and OECD Indexes has opposite meaning. 
Full data are available only since 2002 
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The outcome is peculiar primarily because the panel is strongly unbalanced towards the 
double negative shocks which hit Europe after 2007 and it does not account for the 
subsequent recovery period; It is thus hard to believe that most flexible countries experienced 
lower levels of unemployment in this period and that the analysis is not influenced by that 
(this will be pointed out later also for the OECD Index, see the robustness checks paragraph). 
Testing for it, the sample is restricted to the crisis period, from 2008 to 2013 (when 
unemployment rose across all Europe): the result is that higher flexibility is still associated 
with lower unemployment, even though the statistical significance is weaker (5% - results not 
reported).  
This outcome, summed with the criticisms of the ILO report (despite the attempt to customize 
the index through its sub-indexes in a more suitable and comparable form), might indicate a 
further evidence on the inappropriateness of the Index for an extensive econometric study, as 
claimed in Section 2. 
Accounting for these criticisms, the analysis moves forward focusing exclusively on the 
OECD Index and its sub-components. 
 
Robustness Checks 
The first consideration is that the framework time-period, as already mentioned earlier, is 
strongly unbalanced towards the financial and sovereign debt crisis years which affected 
Europe (2009-2013). Thus, results might be driven by the strong increase in unemployment 
experienced in those turbulent years since the dataset does not account for the subsequent 
recovery process (recalling from section 1 that unemployment in Europe reached its peak 
level in 2013, and only then it started decreasing). This to say that, during a turmoil, countries 
with the strongest employment protection will experience a lower increase in unemployment, 
ceteris paribus, if their institutional infrastructure properly works (that’s the point of having 
employment protection legislation). What is not clear, however, is how EPL influences the 
recovery attempts of an economy after a shock or in a scenario of positive and sustained 
growth. This is, in principle, the main goal of the analysis, as it should be recall from the 
hysteresis definition introduced in section 1. 
To study the effects of labour market institutions in a growing economic environment, then, 
the time-period of the analysis is restricted to the pre-crisis period, i.e. from 2000 to 2008 
(included), when the European economy was constantly growing and unemployment was 
lowering across regions and countries (see chapter 1.B). 
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Restricting the sample period, results change only in magnitude, which is lower, but the sign 
remains the same and it still indicates a negative relationship between strictness of the 
employment protection legislation and unemployment. However, using country fixed effect 
the coefficient becomes not significant at 5%, but its p-value is relatively low and equal to 
0.078, i.e. within a 10% confidence interval (Table 10). 
Table 10: Impact of EPL on total unemployment rate, 20-64 years old (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Unmp_Tot r1 r2 r3 
        
oecd_epl -2.36*** -0.80** -0.38 
lagged_unmp    0.67***  0.89*** 
tax_wedge    0.03 -0.06 
union_dens   -0.02  0.03 
unmp_ben    0.10***  0.09*** 
gdp_g   -0.09*** -0.07*** 
acc_cpi   -0.25*** -0.24*** 
sec_educ   -0.04  0.00 
urb_proxy    0.00  0.01 
tech_quota   -0.07 -0.01 
age_median   -0.63*** -0.04*** 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 2077 1567 1567 
R2 0.17 0.66 0.93 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Results hold also for long-term unemployment (even though with weaker significance) and 
young unemployment (outputs are reported in the Appendix, Tables A9 and A10). Thus, 
apparently, it does not matter what is the economic scenario, EPL and unemployment are 
negatively correlated.  
To test these results, more extensive robustness checks are carried on the restricted sample of 
total unemployment, using the regression with regional and time fixed effects and all the 
controls. All the tables showing the numerical results are reported in the Appendix. 
To start, the biggest countries of the Union – Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, 
Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland and Portugal - are dropped from the dataset 
to see whether one of them is driving the outcomes (Table A11 in the Appendix). Sign and 
magnitude of the coefficients do not change with respect the broad regression, but removing 
Germany the OECD Index coefficient is not significant anymore (while it still is checking the 
full sample). Explanations of Germany result might be its large weight in the dataset (it is one 
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of the countries with the highest number of regions), associated with the peculiarities of its 
recovery process after the reunification, when it managed to strongly reduce unemployment in 
the Est stabilizing the country economic and social equilibrium, in particular in the first 
decade of the 2000 [Rinne, Zimmermann, 2012]. 
Single country influence is not the only possible country-division for the robustness checks. 
Relying on the definition of Core, Peripheral, Inner and Outer Countries provided by Barlett 
and Prica (2016), countries are divided in four macro-regions based on their economic 
prosperity and geographical position: 
Table 11: European Countries Aggregation 
Inner Core Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, Finland 
Inner Peripheral Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal 
Outer Core 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway 
Outer Peripheral Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Macedonia, Slovenia 
 
The model is then applied to the different aggregations described. 
Results (Table A12 in the Appendix) confirm the initial estimates for core and outer clusters, 
but the peripheral one shows the opposite sign, i.e. a stricter employment protection 
regulation is associated with higher unemployment. The inner country cluster has, in the end, 
not significant results. 
This result might indicate that labour market institutions have different outcomes according to 
the efficiency of the underlying economies. Peripheral countries18 are usually considered to be 
more risky, fragile, and with weaker economic health than core countries19: in this kind of 
scenario, then, employment protection seems to have the opposite effect of the one described 
so far. Even the non-significance of the EPL coefficient of the “inner-only” regression moves 
in this direction, since aggregating Mediterranean countries and Core continental countries it 
is not possible to find an effect of labour market institutions on unemployment. 
This outcome might indicate countries’ heterogeneity and unobserved variables in the sample. 
Another interesting control is on the component of the OECD Index, i.e. regular (EPR), 
temporary (EPT) and collective (EPC) contracts. 
Regressing the single sub-indexes instead of the broad index, results are different: EPR 
coefficient loses significance in the pre-crisis period while it is still significant and negative in 
                                                 
18 Observations in the sample are largely unbalanced towards inner peripheral 
19 Interest Rates of Government bonds are usually a good parameter to further define this kind of aggregation 
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the full sample; EPT sign, magnitude and significance are the same of the outline regression 
(both in the overall period and in the restricted one) and, in the end, a higher level of EPC is 
associated with a higher level of unemployment, indicating that legislation on collective 
dismissals increases unemployment in periods of economic prosperity. Results are reported in 
the Appendix (Tables A13-14-15) for the pre-crisis period. 
By Country and time-period controls are not the only one available. Given the nature of the 
analysis, which emphasizes the regional approach, it makes sense to divide the regions in 
macro-groups according to common characteristics.  
The panel is then divided in quantiles: once the variable of interest is selected, the average of 
each region is taken in the time-period of reference; the quantiles of this average are 
computed, and each region is assigned to its correspondent quantile. In this way, it is possible 
to build homogeneous groups of regions (focusing on one characteristic at a time), to study 
the effect of EPL without following a Country logic but a regional one. Each quantile, then, is 
sequentially removed from the regression to check whether any characteristic is driving the 
results of the analysis. 
The control is computed on most of the variables used in the regression, and tables with 
results are presented in the Appendix (from A16 to A22). To summarize: 
▪ Unemployment level aggregation: Removing 3rd and 5th quantiles (those with higher 
unemployment), the EPL coefficient becomes not-significant at a 5% level. Dropping 
the 3rd quantile, however, the output becomes significant considering a minimum 
increase in the confidence interval (p.value = 0.061), while dropping the 5th one it 
stays far from significance; 
▪ Employment rate aggregation: Results are driven by the 1st quantile, i.e. regions with 
lowest levels of employment. Removing them from the sample, the output loses 
significance;  
▪ GDP per capita (PPS) aggregation: Results are the same as for Employment rate 
aggregation; 
▪ Secondary education aggregation: Results are robust across all the quantiles; 
▪ Urban Proxy aggregation: Results are robust across all quantiles except for the 5th one, 
i.e. removing rural areas (the ones with highest level of agricultural employment) the 
coefficient loses significance; 
▪ Technological level aggregation: Results are robust across all quantiles; 
▪ Median Age aggregation: Results are robust across all quantiles except if we remove 
the “youngest” regions, which appear to drive the outcomes; 
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To summarize: carrying on the analysis from 2000 to 2013 seems not appropriate since the 
dataset is largely biased towards the crisis period started in 2008, when it is assumed that a 
higher EPL works to reduce unemployment. Since it is of much more interest to study the role 
of labour market institutions in a growing economic scenario, the sample is restricted to 2000-
2008 and then various robustness checks are implemented.  
While reducing the time-period does not change the outcomes of the analysis, some checks 
make the coefficient of the EPL Index not significant. Overall results are mainly driven by 
Germany, low GDP and employment rate regions and rural areas. Excluding them from the 
sample, EPL becomes not significant in influencing the unemployment rate. 
Moreover, countries’ economic efficiency seems to matter in the choice of strictness of 
employment protection, since in “problematic” countries a higher incidence of labour market 
institutions is associated with higher levels of unemployment. On the contrary, economically 
solid countries show the opposite behaviour. 
In the end, results change also de-composing the OECD Index on its sub-components: 
strictness of EPC is associated with higher unemployment levels (in both sample periods). 
This confirms also some of the conclusions anticipated in the review of the literature, where it 
was stressed the importance to differentiate across effects of different labour market 
institutions.
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3.C A step further: EPL and Economic Sectors 
The large availability of regional data on Eurostat allows the analysis to move further and 
focus on more specific details about the economic outcomes of EPL. Indeed, regional 
employment rates are available for six macro sectors: agriculture, industry, construction, 
services, financials and public administration. This de-composition allows to study in a deeper 
way how labour market institutions impacts on different economic structures, and which 
sectors are more affected by the strictness of employment protection legislation. 
The first step of the analysis follows the same procedure adopted in the previous chapter 
studying unemployment rate.  
 
𝐸𝑐𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑋 + 𝜇𝑟 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟𝑡 
 
The same approach is then replicated to each sectorial employment rate alone, for a total of 
six regressions more. 
 
𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑋 +  𝜇𝑟 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟𝑡 
 
The model then makes a step further modifying the dataset to introduce sectorial fixed effect 
(Equation 18) and the interaction between sector and region fixed effects (Equation 19). The 
expanded dataset allows to cluster the data at a more punctual and singular level in order to 
obtain a more efficient estimation which consider both regional and sectorial specificities, 
dealing in this way with explicit sectorial and regional&sectorial shocks which would gone 
missing using equation 17. 
 
𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑋 +  𝜇𝑟 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝜗𝑠 + 𝜖𝑟𝑡 
𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑋 +  + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝜇𝜗𝑟𝑠 + 𝜖𝑟𝑡 
 
Again, the analysis is first carried on the entire period and then in the pre-crisis years and with 
the sub-components of the OECD EPL Index to check for eventual differences. 
  
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
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First specification 
Results of regression 16 (total employment rate) in the entire period are equal to the ones 
obtained in the unemployment model: A stricter Employment Protection Legislation is 
associated to a higher level of employment. However, restricting the sample period, on the 
other hand, results become not-significant (Table 12). 
Table 12: Impact of EPL on total employment rate (full and pre-crisis period) 
 2000-2013 2000-2008 
Dep_Var: Emp_Tot r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
    
   
oecd_epl  3.24***  1.50***  1.13*** -0.54  0.10  0.31 
lagged_unmp    0.77***  0.94***    0.52***  0.92*** 
tax_wedge   -0.20*** -0.11***   -0.11*  0.06 
union_dens   -0.14*** -0.16***   -0.11*** -0.11** 
unmp_ben   -0.01 -0.01   -0.08*** -0.08*** 
gdp_g    0.06***  0.06***    0.07***  0.06*** 
acc_cpi    0.17***  0.19***    0.12***  0.20*** 
sec_educ    0.02  0.02***    0.12***  0.03*** 
tech_quota    0.07*  0.04***    0.24***  0.04*** 
age_median    0.49***  0.06***    0.84***  0.09*** 
 
      
Controls - Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 3396 2657 2657 2134 1591 1591 
R2 0.19 0.76 0.97 0.35 0.66 0.97 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Decomposing at sectorial level the outcome becomes more interesting20: accounting for the 
financial and sovereign crisis in the sample, employment protection shows its efficacy in the 
construction and services sectors, while it does not result significant for the other four (Table 
13). 
  
                                                 
20Controls are removed from tables for a clearer visualization. The outline regression is always the one with 
regional and time fixed effects 
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Table 13: Impact of EPL on sectorial employment rate (2000-2013) 
Dep_Var: Sector 
Employment Rate 
agr ind constr serv fin p.a. 
    
   
oecd_epl 0.14 0.14 0.70*** 0.41*** 0.05 0.31 
 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 2585 2889 2892 2934 2810 2935 
R2 0.58 0.68 0.62 0.43 0.93 0.74 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Discharging the crisis years, results change. The EPL coefficient has a significant and positive 
impact on agriculture and construction and a significant and negative impact on the financial 
sector employment rate. It loses significance on the services sector (Table 14). 
Table 14: Impact of EPL on sectorial employment rate (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Sector 
Employment Rate 
agr ind constr serv fin p.a. 
    
   
oecd_epl 0.41** -0.21 0.41** -0.13 -0.69** -0.18 
 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 1535 1733 1726 1761 1716 1762 
R2 0.45 0.42 0.35 0.21 0.81 0.68 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Accounting for these differences across time periods, it might become useful to study the 
years of the crisis. Here coefficients are all positive and significant, except for the agricultural 
sector (outcome not reported). 
Considering the sub components of the EPL index, more insights are available (Results are 
reported in Tables A23-24-25 in the Appendix only for the pre-crisis sample): 
• EPR In the full sample, regular contract regulation has a negative impact on the 
financial sector employment rate, it is not significant for the industry sector while it is 
positive for the other sectors employment rates. In the pre-crisis restricted sample, 
however, it is negatively associated with the employment level of industrial and 
financial sectors. It is still positive, however, for construction and public 
administration, and not significant for agriculture. In the on-going crisis restricted 
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sample (2009-2013), on the other hand, for all sectors the coefficient is positive and 
significant at least at 5%; 
• EPT In the full sample, temporary contract legislation is associated with a higher 
level of employment only for the construction sector. All other sectors have EPL 
coefficient not significant. In the pre-crisis sample, EPT has a negative impact on the 
employment rate of the financial sector, while it’s the opposite for agriculture and 
construction sectors. During the crisis period, temporary contract regulation is 
associated with higher employment rates for all the sectors with the exception of 
agriculture (again), which has a non-significant coefficient; 
• EPC Collective dismissal regulation confirms the trend seen in the unemployment 
analysis, and even in the full sample is associated with lower employment rate for 
industrial and financial sectors, while it is not significant for the others. In the pre-
crisis period, the only significant coefficients are the one of the industry sector, which 
is negative, and the one of the public administration, which is positive. During the 
crisis timeframe, on the other hand, a stricter regulation has a positive effect on 
construction and services employment rates, negative on agricultural sector, and not 
significant on the others; 
To summarize, then, employment protection is considered effective in maintaining higher 
employment levels during economic turmoil, but it does not show statistical relevance in 
positive economic growth scenarios. Moreover, it becomes relevant to de-compose the 
analysis by sector employment rate and the index by its sub components, since the effects 
differ across economic segments for different legislation settings in different economic 
scenarios. Thus, it might be of interest to differentiate employment protection on the type of 
sector in which firms operate. 
However, this simple model might suffer idiosyncratic events at sectorial level which would 
likely influence the outcomes. It becomes then interesting to modify the dataset in order to 
cluster the observations to a further level, to account for specific sectorial shocks and or 
trends. 
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Second specification 
Digging further in the dataset, it is possible to achieve a more robust result clustering by 
sector and by region. 
As reported in table 15, results are the same whether it has been controlled for region and 
sector separately or both at the same time. EPL coefficient is positive and significant in the 
overall period.  
Restricting the sample period, as in the first specification, coefficients of labour market 
regulation become not significant.  
Table 15: Impact of EPL on total employment rate (full and pre-crisis period) 
 2000-2013 2000-2008 
Dep_Var: Sector 
Employment Rates 
r1 r2 r1 r2 
   
  
oecd_epl  0.16**  0.25**  0.01 -0.02 
lagged_unmp  0.94***  0.69***  0.94***  0.32*** 
tax_wedge -0.02* -0.05*** -0.03 -0.07** 
union_dens -0.02* -0.02  0.00  0.01 
unmp_ben  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.01 
gdp_g  0.02***  0.01***  0.02***  0.03*** 
acc_cpi  0.02*  0.02  0.02  0.00 
sec_educ  0.01  0.02*  0.01  0.03** 
tech_quota  0.01  0.01  0.03   0.06** 
age_median  0.06***  0.16***  0.18**  0.23*** 
 
    
Regional Fixed Effect Yes - Yes - 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectorial Fixed Effect Yes - Yes - 
Reg*Sec Fixed Effect - Yes - Yes 
N Obs. 12731 12731 7671 7671 
R2 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
However, the outcome in the full sample is driven by the construction sector: removing it 
from the regression, EPL coefficient becomes not significant also there (while it still is 
dropping the others). In the pre-crisis period, on the other hand, the non-significance of the 
result is robust across different sectors (tables not reported). 
Studying the effects of the sub-components of the OECD Index, results do not change in the 
pre-crisis period, since coefficients remain not significant (results are not reported).
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Conclusions 
The view on Employment Protection Legislation effects on labour market will always be the 
playing field of political debates and of the subsequent economic policies. 
Those in favour of higher flexibility argue that strictness of EPL is responsible for the 
structural increase in unemployment after a shock hits the economy, and of its consequent 
slower recovery process compared to the one of an ideal flexible market. 
Those in favour of higher strictness, on the other hand, do not recognize this effect as true, 
and consider a stronger employment protection as a fundamental of the Welfare State and of 
the Rights of the workers, which cannot be sacrificed in the name of a higher growth 
(correlation in which they do not either believe). 
According to OECD data and recent reforms implemented in major European countries, 
economies seem to move towards a generalized process of liberalization of the labour market, 
even though the overall level of protection in Europe is still far from the one of United States, 
considered the most flexible market in the world. 
This process is probably mainly driven by the difficulties to recover from the shocks that hit 
Europe in 2008 and 2011, events that challenged the stability of the Monetary Union, and 
caused higher levels of unemployment in many countries, pushing politicians to implement 
important reforms in order to try to improve the situation. 
Academic research is providing studies on this topic since the 80s, when the hysteresis 
hypothesis and the insider-outsider model was proposed by Blanchard and Summers, through 
the analysis of hysteresis in time-series data of unemployment and the study of the 
relationship between EPL, measured with indicators provided by sovra-national institutions 
like the OECD or the World Bank, and unemployment rates. 
Talking about the hysteretic behaviour of unemployment rates, results from the literature are 
mixed for OECD countries, except for the United States, where a stationary path is widely 
accepted as a fact. 
Adopting both panel-data and time-series approaches in Europe, and confronting them with 
the results obtained using USA and USA Federal States data, in this work it has been found a 
significant statistical difference in the behaviour of unemployment on the two sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean, providing evidences of the effective presence of hysteresis in most of the 
European Countries (even though with some exceptions) in the time-frame analysed. 
Studying the causes of hysteresis, Employment Protection Legislation becomes then one of 
the major “suspects”. The literature results widely accept the hypothesis that stricter 
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protection has a bad influence on the level of unemployment in the various countries, but they 
also avoid generalizing on the overall effect making distinctions on different institutions. 
This analysis adopts two different approaches in studying the impact of Employment 
Protection Legislation in the labour market, investigating the effect both on unemployment 
and sectorial employment, in order to match EPL and economic structures. 
The panel regression indicates a negative relationship between strictness of EPL (measured by 
the OECD) and total unemployment, long-term unemployment and young unemployment, 
with different magnitudes, but all statistically significant.  
The index developed by Fraser, on the other hand, shows opposite results. To explain this 
difference, and to choose between the two options, the model is tested on the crisis period, 
where unemployment should rise more on flexible labour markets, since crisis period are the 
ones where EPL should work the most avoiding excessive rise in unemployment. Here the 
labour market regulation index of Fraser still indicates that a higher flexibility is associated 
with lower unemployment (while the OECD Index shows the opposite), posing doubts on the 
reliability of this outcome. This, summed with criticisms pointed out by ILO, says that this 
index is probably not a good measure to use in an extensive econometric analysis. 
The study then moves forward relying only to the OECD Index, to check the robustness of the 
results. The first consideration is the time-period used in the analysis, which is largely biased 
towards the financial and sovereign debts crisis. The sample period is then restricted to 2000-
2008 to study the effect of EPL in a positive economic growth scenario. 
For the broad regression, results hold at 1% confidence interval, indicating that the stricter the 
legislation, the lower the unemployment rate. However, the analysis is likely biased by 
countries’ heterogeneity and possible unobserved variables. Further checks give some insights 
on what drives most the model’s outcomes and which problems this kind of model might 
incur into, as countries’ heterogeneity and unobserved variables: 
• Dropping Germany from the dataset, EPL coefficient is not significant anymore, while 
it is dropping the other countries. An explanation might be the excellent management 
of the reunification process of the Country, which brought the unemployment to a 
persistent decrease, also during the 2008 financial crisis, and its size in the sample, 
which is one of the biggest; 
• Aggregating countries by economic performance (core and peripheral), results are 
mixed based on their “economic efficiency”. In problematic countries, like the 
Mediterranean ones, a higher EPL is associated with a higher unemployment, while in 
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core countries the opposite is true. The political and economic stability, then, seems to 
matter in the way employment protection legislation influences the labour market; 
• Aggregating regions by common characteristics it is possible to see that results are 
mainly driven by high unemployment regions, low employment/GDP and rural areas. 
Dropping them from the sample, EPL coefficient becomes not significant; 
• In the end, studying the sub-component of the Index makes other insights available; 
The regular contract legislation is not significant in the pre-crisis sample, while it is 
the temporary contract one, with negative sign. On the opposite, strictness of 
collective dismissal regulation is associated with higher unemployment (also in the 
full sample framework), showing the completely opposite behaviour; 
Studying EPL impact on unemployment, then, it is not possible to derive a single conclusion. 
However, results are still indicating possible suited intervention in the labour market 
legislation of countries which determined characteristics. For example, countries whit a 
preponderant union density might consider increasing the flexibility of the collective 
dismissal regulation (where it might be supposed that it has a higher impact), or, for 
Mediterranean countries, it would likely help to reduce unemployment decreasing the overall 
strictness level of Employment Protection in the beginning of a recovery process after a 
shock. On the other hand, advanced countries with homogeneous and highly productive 
regions can focus on different kind of reforms instead of working on changing the status quo. 
Moving to the employment framework, results are specular to the ones described so far for the 
full period, while the EPL coefficient is not significant in the pre-crisis years. It becomes then 
more interesting to study the effects on single sectors employment, where results are different, 
mostly between industry and financial sectors, which are negatively affected by EPL, and 
construction, agriculture and public administration, to which employment is enhanced by the 
strictness of the regulation. However, this specification misses possible idiosyncratic events 
and trends at sectorial level, which likely influence the output. Accounting for this, in the full-
sample period results hold as above, but they are driven by the construction sector. Removing 
it, the EPL coefficient becomes not significant.  
In the pre-crisis period, on the other hand, there is not statistical significance, and this 
outcome is robust across different sectors. 
Results, then, are mainly driven by the financial and sovereign crisis years and the 
construction sector, in which a stricter EPL helps maintaining higher levels of employment 
during economic turmoil. It would be of interest, anyway, to study the possibility of 
implementing “customized” regulations based on the sector in which firms operate. This 
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might lead to an overall less rigid market in which economic sectors can express their 
potential without being subject to legislation thought for other economic realities which do 
not suit them correctly. 
The same approach might be harder to implement through a “regional” employment 
protection legislation, since it would drive firms to simply move their productivity factors to 
more suitable areas. Nevertheless, the regional and sectorial approach adopted in the analysis 
hopefully helped to infer interesting insights on the relationship between unemployment and 
labour market institutions in Europe and possible solutions to implement through economic 
policies according to the characteristics of the economy in which the legislator operates.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of unemployment in European Countries 
(Source: Eurostat, 2017. Reference Period: 2000-2016) 
Country 
Average 
Unmp 
Max 
Unmp 
Min 
Unmp 
Year 
Max 
Unmp 
Year Min 
Unmp 
Stdev 
Austria 4.99 6.30 3.60 2016 2000 0.66 
Belgium 7.83 8.90 6.10 2004 2001 0.70 
Bulgaria 11.38 20.10 5.00 2001 2008 3.90 
Croatia 13.68 17.70 8.30 2014 2008 2.65 
Cyprus 7.65 16.80 3.00 2015 2002 4.59 
Czech Republic 6.75 9.30 3.50 2000 2016 1.37 
Denmark 5.58 7.90 3.10 2012 2008 1.36 
Estonia 9.66 18.90 4.00 2010 2007 3.50 
Finland 8.36 10.20 6.30 2000 2008 0.87 
France 9.10 10.60 7.30 2015 2008 0.85 
Germany 7.43 11.20 3.90 2005 2016 2.08 
Greece 15.01 27.90 7.30 2013 2008 7.13 
Hungary 7.77 11.40 4.30 2010 2016 2.07 
Iceland 4.45 7.60 2.40 2010 2007 1.79 
Ireland 8.17 15.20 3.70 2012 2000 4.13 
Italy 9.12 13.00 5.70 2014 2007 1.99 
Latvia 12.06 20.60 5.30 2010 2007 3.69 
Lithuania 11.48 18.30 4.00 2010 2007 4.13 
Luxembourg 4.59 6.60 1.80 2015 2001 1.31 
Malta 6.54 8.50 4.10 2003 2016 0.79 
Netherlands 5.14 7.90 3.10 2014 2001 1.29 
Norway 3.61 5.00 2.30 2016 2008 0.64 
Poland 12.49 20.50 5.40 2002 2016 4.84 
Portugal 10.17 17.50 4.80 2013 2000 3.40 
Romania 7.02 8.80 5.50 2002 2008 0.73 
Slovakia 14.51 19.70 8.70 2000 2008 3.20 
Slovenia 7.13 10.80 4.20 2013 2008 1.63 
Spain 15.87 26.30 7.90 2013 2007 6.21 
Sweden 7.13 9.30 4.90 2010 2000 0.97 
United Kingdom 5.96 8.40 4.60 2011 2004 1.24 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of unemployment in US Federal States 
(Source: FRED, 2017. Reference Period: 2000-2016) 
Country 
Average 
Unmp 
Max 
Unmp 
Min Unmp 
Year Max 
Unmp 
Year Min 
Unmp 
Stdev 
CA 7.44 12.20 4.70 2010 2000 2.42 
WIU 5.67 10.40 2.80 2010 2000 1.62 
IN 6.18 10.90 2.90 2010 2000 2.12 
NY 6.18 8.90 4.20 2009 2000 1.50 
FL 6.15 11.20 3.10 2009 2006 2.38 
TX 5.76 8.40 4.00 2009 2000 1.26 
MI 7.65 14.90 3.20 2009 2000 2.58 
AL 6.53 11.90 3.80 2009 2007 2.13 
MA 5.51 8.80 2.60 2009 2000 1.53 
IL 6.93 11.20 4.20 2009 2000 1.93 
GA 6.43 10.50 3.40 2009 2000 2.22 
MO 6.07 9.80 3.10 2009 2000 1.63 
TN 6.37 11.10 3.70 2009 2000 1.91 
OH 6.45 11.00 3.80 2009 2000 1.83 
NC 6.72 11.30 3.30 2010 2000 2.17 
NJU 6.25 10.30 3.30 2010 2000 2.04 
CO 5.44 8.90 2.70 2010 2000 1.82 
WA 6.69 10.40 4.60 2009 2007 1.60 
SC 7.12 11.70 3.70 2009 2000 2.14 
AK 7.00 8.00 6.30 2009 2000 0.53 
NV 7.21 13.70 3.90 2010 2000 3.22 
PA 5.94 8.70 4.00 2010 2000 1.36 
AZ 6.37 11.20 3.70 2009 2007 2.11 
VA 4.53 7.40 2.10 2010 2000 1.39 
KY 6.65 10.90 4.00 2009 2000 1.87 
AR 5.98 8.40 3.90 2011 2016 1.31 
LA 6.18 9.50 3.90 2005 2006 1.11 
WV 6.16 8.80 4.10 2010 2008 1.23 
MN 4.88 8.10 3.00 2009 2000 1.27 
HI 4.46 7.30 2.40 2009 2006 1.45 
OR 7.23 11.90 4.50 2009 2016 1.92 
NM 5.96 8.30 3.70 2010 2007 1.28 
MD 5.11 7.80 3.40 2010 2000 1.38 
CT 5.82 9.20 2.20 2010 2000 1.94 
KS 5.08 7.30 3.40 2009 2000 0.98 
IA 4.37 6.60 2.40 2009 2000 0.94 
ND 3.27 4.30 2.60 2009 2014 0.39 
MT 5.01 7.40 2.90 2010 2007 1.14 
UT 4.70 8.00 2.30 2009 2007 1.56 
DC 7.30 10.50 5.40 2011 2000 1.47 
DE 5.21 8.70 3.30 2009 2001 1.70 
ID 5.51 9.70 2.90 2009 2007 1.83 
NH 4.21 6.60 2.60 2009 2000 1.06 
OK 4.78 7.10 2.90 2009 2000 0.99 
WY 4.39 7.20 2.70 2009 2007 1.10 
ME 5.46 8.30 3.20 2009 2000 1.56 
NE 3.62 4.80 2.80 2009 2000 0.56 
MS 7.30 10.80 5.00 2010 2000 1.60 
RI 6.99 11.30 4.00 2009 2000 2.54 
VT 4.25 7.00 2.60 2009 2000 1.01 
SD 3.58 5.20 2.40 2010 2000 0.75 
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Table A3: DF-GLS test on unemployment in US Federal States 
(Source: FRED, 2017. Reference Period: 1991-2016) 
State 
Optimal 
Lag 
T-Stat 
1% Crit. 
Value 
5% Crit. 
Value 
10% Crit. 
Value 
US 12 -2.31** -2.580 -1.967 -1.653 
CA 15 -3.378*** -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
WIU 15 -1.721* -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
IN 6 -1.756* -2.580 -1.989 -1.673 
NY 12 -2.499** -2.580 -1.967 -1.653 
FL 14 -2.446** -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
TX 14 -2.29** -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
MI 13 -1.469 -2.580 -1.963 -1.649 
AL 15 -2.41** -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
MA 7 -0.958 -2.580 -1.985 -1.670 
IL 9 -2.191** -2.580 -1.978 -1.663 
GA 15 -2.065** -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
MO 14 -1.841* -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
TN 11 -1.741* -2.580 -1.971 -1.656 
OH 9 -2.165** -2.580 -1.978 -1.663 
NC 5 -1.891* -2.580 -1.992 -1.676 
NJU 14 -2.456** -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
CO 8 -2.484** -2.580 -1.982 -1.667 
WA 5 -2.709*** -2.580 -1.992 -1.676 
SC 12 -1.673* -2.580 -1.967 -1.653 
AK 2 -2.81*** -2.580 -2.001 -1.684 
NV 9 -2.675*** -2.580 -1.978 -1.663 
PA 8 -2.198** -2.580 -1.982 -1.667 
AZ 14 -2.152** -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
VA 13 -1.528 -2.580 -1.963 -1.649 
KY 14 -1.923* -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
AR 5 -0.582 -2.580 -1.992 -1.676 
LA 15 -1.889* -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
WV 13 -0.901 -2.580 -1.963 -1.649 
MN 8 -2.124** -2.580 -1.982 -1.667 
HI 14 -1.666* -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
OR 14 -2.731*** -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
NM 11 -2.454** -2.580 -1.971 -1.656 
MD 7 -2.075** -2.580 -1.985 -1.67 
CT 14 -2.683*** -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
KS 15 -2.82*** -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
IA 10 -1.714* -2.580 -1.974 -1.66 
ND 15 -1.318 -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
MT 12 -1.335 -2.580 -1.967 -1.653 
UT 15 -3.502*** -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
DC 5 -1.882* -2.580 -1.992 -1.676 
DE 12 -1.344 -2.580 -1.967 -1.653 
ID 14 -3.199*** -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
NH 7 -0.541 -2.580 -1.985 -1.67 
OK 14 -1.275 -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
WY 14 -1.884* -2.580 -1.959 -1.645 
ME 7 -0.852 -2.580 -1.985 -1.67 
NE 13 -1.08 -2.580 -1.963 -1.649 
MS 15 -1.329 -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
RI 5 -1.509 -2.580 -1.992 -1.676 
VT 15 -0.83 -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
SD 15 -2.237** -2.580 -1.955 -1.642 
Optimal lag chosen with the Nq-Perron seq t criteria. Confidence level* p< 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p 
<0.01 
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Controls used in the regression: 
• Tax_wedge (State level): Tax wedge is defined as the ratio between the amount of 
taxes paid by an average single worker (a single person at 100% of average earnings) 
without children and the corresponding total labour cost for the employer. The average 
tax wedge measures the extent to which tax on labour income discourages 
employment. This indicator is measured in percentage of labour cost. The sign of this 
indicator is expected to be negative, i.e. to increase unemployment; Source: OECD; 
• Union density (State Level): Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage 
and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage 
and salary earners (OECD Labour Force Statistics). Density is calculated using survey 
data, wherever possible, and administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-
employed members otherwise. Data are expressed in percentages and presented from 
1980. The sign might change whether the time-period analysed comprises economic 
turmoil, when unions avoid larger dismissals, or not; Source: OECD; 
• Unemployment Benefits (State Level): Benefit entitlement before tax as a 
percentage of previous earnings before tax. Data are averages over replacement rates 
at two earnings levels (average and two-thirds of average earnings). The sign is 
expected to be negative since they disincentive the research of a new job. Source: 
OECD; 
• GDP growth (NUTS2 level): Computed as the annual growth of the nominal GDP 
per capita of each region. It accounts for regional macroeconomic shocks, and its sign 
is expected to be negative. Source: Eurostat; 
• Accelerating CPI (State Level): Delta between current and lagged harmonised 
consumer price index. It’s a second indicator of macroeconomic performance, but it 
accounts for country-level shocks, and its sign is expected to be negative, as for the 
GDP growth. Source: Eurostat; 
• Secondary Education (NUTS2 level): Percentage of people with at least secondary 
education per region. It controls for the environmental infrastructure in which the 
economy of the region operates. Its sign is expected to be negative, i.e. higher 
educated areas should have an healthier economic environment. Source: Eurostat; 
• Urban Proxy (NUTS2 level): Percentage of people employed in the agricultural 
sector. Rural areas are usually associated with higher unemployment and this variable 
control for this. The expected sign is thus positive. Source: Eurostat; 
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• Technological Level (NUTS2 level): Percentage of people employed Research and 
Development. This control measures how advanced are the single regions. The 
expected sign is negative, since higher technologically developed regions should be 
associated with lower unemployment. Source: Eurostat; 
• Median Age (NUTS2 level): Median age of the population in each region. Since 
young people have more difficulties finding a job (see young unemployment rates), 
this control account for the structural presence of a younger and then harder to employ 
quota of the population. Its sign is expected to be negative. Source: Eurostat; 
 
Table A4: Impact of EPL on Long-Term Unemployment (2000-2013) 
Dep_Var: Long-Term 
Unemployment 
r1 r2 r3 
        
oecd_epl -4.57*** -1.37*** -1.18*** 
lagged_unmp    0.89***  0.95*** 
tax_wedge    0.12***  0.11*** 
union_dens    0.05  0.07** 
unmp_ben    0.02*  0.03** 
gdp_g   -0.05*** -0.06*** 
acc_cpi   -0.16*** -0.17*** 
sec_educ    0.04*  0.00 
urb_proxy   -0.05  0.01 
tech_quota   -0.02  0.00 
age_median   -0.20** -0.03*** 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 2936 2305 2305 
R2 0.23 0.84 0.93 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A5: Impact of EPL on Young Unemployment (2000-2013) 
Dep_Var: Young 
Unemployment 
r1 r2 r3 
        
oecd_epl -13.73*** -4.56*** -3.59*** 
lagged_unmp    0.77***  0.87*** 
tax_wedge    0.28***  0.16* 
union_dens    0.32***  0.39*** 
unmp_ben    0.07*   0.08*** 
gdp_g   -0.17*** -0.18*** 
acc_cpi   -0.44*** -0.46*** 
sec_educ    0.10 -0.02 
urb_proxy   -0.18 -0.01 
tech_quota   -0.11 -0.06*** 
age_median   -0.87*** -0.07 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 3003 2338 2338 
R2 0.31 0.79 0.92 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A6: Fraser Index measure of EPL on total unemployment (2000-2013) 
Dep_Var: Unmp_Tot r1 r2 r3 
        
fraser_epl -2.38*** -0.79*** -0.70*** 
lagged_unmp    0.87***  0.92*** 
tax_wedge    0.02 -0.00 
union_dens    0.08*  0.11** 
unmp_ben    0.06***  0.06*** 
gdp_g   -0.09*** -0.09*** 
acc_cpi   -0.24*** -0.24*** 
sec_educ   -0.01 -0.01* 
urb_proxy   -0.24*** -0.02 
tech_quota   -0.10*** -0.02*** 
age_median   -0.15 -0.04*** 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 3419 2534 2534 
R2 0.27 0.86 0.94 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A7: Fraser Index measure of EPL on long term unemployment (2000-2013) 
Dep_Var: Long Term 
Unemployment 
r1 r2 r3 
        
fraser_epl -1.60*** -0.51*** -0.42*** 
lagged_unmp    0.89***  0.94*** 
tax_wedge    0.09***  0.08*** 
union_dens    0.01  0.03 
unmp_ben    0.05***  0.05*** 
gdp_g   -0.07*** -0.07*** 
acc_cpi   -0.21*** -0.21*** 
sec_educ    0.01  0.00 
urb_proxy   -0.10*  0.00 
tech_quota   -0.05* -0.01 
age_median    0.02 -0.01 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 3020 2207 2207 
R2 0.26 0.85 0.93 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A8: Fraser Index measure of EPL on young unemployment (2000-2013) 
Dep_Var: Young 
Unemployment 
r1 r2 r3 
        
fraser_epl -4.45*** -1.94*** -1.58*** 
lagged_unmp    0.76***  0.86*** 
tax_wedge    0.17*  0.06 
union_dens    0.19*  0.30*** 
unmp_ben    0.15***  0.15*** 
gdp_g   -0.19*** -0.19*** 
acc_cpi   -0.52*** -0.51*** 
sec_educ    0.04 -0.04* 
urb_proxy   -0.39* -0.04 
tech_quota   -0.25*** -0.08*** 
age_median   -0.18 -0.02 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 3090 2240 2240 
R2 0.32 0.8 0.93 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A9: Impact of EPL on Long Term Unemployment (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Long-Term 
Unemployment 
r1 r2 r3 
        
oecd_epl -1.02* -0.50* -0.32 
lagged_unmp    0.69***  0.88*** 
tax_wedge    0.10**  0.03 
union_dens   -0.09** -0.07* 
unmp_ben    0.06*** 0.08*** 
gdp_g   -0.06*** -0.05*** 
acc_cpi   -0.20*** -0.22*** 
sec_educ    0.00  0.01 
urb_proxy    0.09  0.01 
tech_quota   -0.07*  0.00 
age_median   -0.35*** -0.01 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 1731 1299 1299 
R2 0.12 0.69 0.93 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A10: Impact of EPL on Young Unemployment (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Long-Term 
Unemployment 
r1 r2 r3 
        
oecd_epl -3.29* -2.23** -2.11*** 
lagged_unmp    0.59***  0.84*** 
tax_wedge   -0.05 -0.21 
union_dens   -0.08  0.08 
unmp_ben    0.17***  0.16*** 
gdp_g   -0.22*** -0.16*** 
acc_cpi   -0.65*** -0.60*** 
sec_educ   -0.07 -0.03 
urb_proxy    0.08  0.00 
tech_quota   -0.26* -0.06** 
age_median   -1.15*** -0.06 
        
Controls - Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes - 
Country Fixed Effects - - Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
        
N Obs. 1808 1351 1351 
R2 0.08 0.56 0.91 
Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
69 
 
Table A11: Single Country Robustness Check, total unemployment (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: 
Unmp_Tot 
r2 ex_GER ex_FRA ex_ITA ex_SPA ex_UK ex_GR ex_SW ex_DK ex_NH ex_FI ex_PT 
             oecd_epl -0.80** -0.59 -0.83** -1.43*** -0.64** -0.66** -1.94*** -0.72** -0.80** -0.88*** -0.79** -0.79** 
l_unmp_tot  0.67***  0.67***  0.68***  0.60***  0.73***  0.67***  0.66***  0.67***  0.67***  0.65***  0.67***  0.66*** 
tax_wedge  0.03  0.01  0.04 -0.10*  0.06  0.03  0.17**  0.05  0.03 -0.05  0.02  0.03 
union_dens -0.02 -0.03 -0.06  0.03 -0.14*** -0.02 -0.01  0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
unmp_ben  0.10***  0.09***  0.11***  0.17***  0.11***  0.10***  0.08***  0.09***  0.10***  0.11***  0.10***  0.10*** 
gdp_g_pc -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
acc_cpi -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.23*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.24*** 
sec_educ -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
urb_proxy  0.00 -0.01 -0.01  0.04  0.02 -0.01 -0.08  0.00  0.00 -0.05 -0.01  0.01 
tech_quota -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09* -0.06 -0.07 -0.10* -0.07 -0.07 
age_median -0.63*** -0.49*** -0.62*** -0.55*** -0.62*** -0.58*** -0.93*** -0.54*** -0.63*** -0.70*** -0.63*** -0.65*** 
             N 1567 1303 1418 1416 1431 1407 1463 1503 1562 1471 1550 1526 
R2 0.66 0.64 0.68 0.66 0.73 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A12: Core/Peripheral Countries Robustness Check, total unemployment (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Unmp_Tot r2 all_core all_per all_inner all_outer 
          
oecd_epl -0.80** -2.97***  1.86***  0.11 -3.44***   
lagged_unmp   0.67***  0.66***  0.52***  0.55***  0.73*** 
tax_wedge   0.03  0.24***  0.13 -0.07 -0.35*** 
union_dens -0.02 -0.07  0.17  0.18** -0.13* 
unmp_ben   0.10***  0.12*** -0.07**  0.00  0.24*** 
gdp_g -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.13** -0.06** -0.07*** 
acc_cpi -0.25*** -0.23***  0.01  0.13* -0.26*** 
sec_educ -0.04 -0.03  0.03 -0.12***  0.04 
urb_proxy   0.00 -0.02 -0.18 -0.07 -0.18 
tech_quota -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.1 
age_median -0.63*** -1.12*** -0.53** -0.56*** -0.72* 
          
N Obs. 1567 1062 505 1089 477 
R2 0.66 0.78 0.5 0.52 0.86 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A13: Regular Contracts EPL, total unemployment (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Unmp_Tot r1 r2 r3 
        
EPR -2.81**  0.06  0.38 
lagged_unmp    0.67***  0.89*** 
tax_wedge    0.06 -0.04 
union_dens   -0.03  0.01 
unmp_ben    0.09***  0.09*** 
gdp_g   -0.10*** -0.08*** 
acc_cpi   -0.26*** -0.24*** 
sec_educ   -0.04 -0.00 
urb_proxy   -0.04  0.00 
tech_quota   -0.08 -0.01 
age_median   -0.58*** -0.04*** 
        
N Obs. 2077 1567 1567 
R2 0.14 0.65 0.93 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A14: Temporary Contracts EPL, total unemployment (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Unmp_Tot r1 r2 r3 
        
EPT -1.00*** -0.38*** -0.23* 
lagged_unmp    0.67***  0.89*** 
tax_wedge    0.02 -0.07 
union_dens   -0.02  0.03 
unmp_ben    0.10***  0.09*** 
gdp_g   -0.08*** -0.07*** 
acc_cpi   -0.24*** -0.23*** 
sec_educ   -0.04 -0.00 
urb_proxy    0.00  0.01 
tech_quota   -0.07 -0.01 
age_median   -0.63*** -0.04*** 
        
N Obs. 2077 1567 1567 
R2 0.17 0.66 0.93 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A15: Collective Dismissal Regulation, total unemployment (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Unmp_Tot r1 r2 r3 
        
EPC  4.75***  2.78***  3.04*** 
lagged_unmp    0.68***  0.89*** 
tax_wedge    0.07 -0.03 
union_dens    0.05  0.10* 
unmp_ben    0.07***  0.06*** 
gdp_g   -0.07*** -0.05*** 
acc_cpi   -0.21*** -0.18*** 
sec_educ   -0.05*  0.00 
urb_proxy   -0.05  0.00 
tech_quota   -0.10* -0.01 
age_median   -0.55*** -0.04*** 
        
N Obs. 2077 1567 1567 
R2 0.18 0.67 0.94 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 
0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A16: Total Unemployment Regional Quantile Aggregation (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: 
Unmp_Tot 
r2 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
    
   
oecd_epl -0.80** -0.94*** -0.71* -0.49 -1.51*** -0.12 
lagged_unmp  0.67***  0.66***  0.66***  0.66***  0.71***  0.44*** 
tax_wedge  0.03 -0.08  0.05  0.07  0.12 -0.03 
union_dens -0.02 -0.01  0.00 -0.06 -0.05  0.14*** 
unmp_ben  0.10***  0.11***  0.10***  0.11***  0.09***  0.05*** 
gdp_g -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.05*** 
acc_cpi -0.25*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.01 
sec_educ -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10*** 
urb_proxy  0.00 -0.05  0.01 -0.05 -0.00 -0.04 
tech_quota -0.07 -0.11* -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11*** 
age_median -0.63*** -0.72*** -0.63*** -0.57*** -0.86*** -0.28*** 
    
   
N Obs. 1567 1327 1218 1267 1223 1233 
R2 0.66 0.58 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.67 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A17: Total Employment Regional Quantile Aggregation (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: 
Unmp_Tot 
r2 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
    
   
oecd_epl -0.80** -0.56 -1.15** -0.73** -0.60* -0.75** 
lagged_unmp  0.67***  0.53***  0.70***  0.67***  0.66***  0.66*** 
tax_wedge  0.03 -0.03  0.08  0.04  0.01 -0.02 
union_dens -0.02  0.18*** -0.08* -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 
unmp_ben  0.10***  0.05**  0.11***  0.10***  0.10***  0.10*** 
gdp_g -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
acc_cpi -0.25*** -0.06 -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.30*** 
sec_educ -0.04 -0.10*** -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
urb_proxy  0.00  0.09  0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
tech_quota -0.07 -0.11** -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 
age_median -0.63*** -0.55*** -0.79*** -0.52*** -0.68*** -0.62*** 
    
   
N Obs. 1567 1269 1256 1228 1207 1308 
R2 0.66 0.52 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.68 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A18: GDP PPS Quantile Aggregation (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: 
Unmp_Tot 
r2 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
    
   
oecd_epl -0.80** -0.22 -1.08*** -0.76** -0.75** -0.76** 
lagged_unmp  0.67***  0.54***  0.67***  0.68***  0.67***  0.67*** 
tax_wedge  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.02 -0.02 
union_dens -0.02  0.14** -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 
unmp_ben  0.10***  0.02  0.11***  0.12***  0.10***  0.10*** 
gdp_g -0.09*** -0.04** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
acc_cpi -0.25*** -0.01 -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.29*** 
sec_educ -0.04 -0.09*** -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 
urb_proxy  0.00  0.07 -0.02 -0.07  0.01 -0.04 
tech_quota -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.09 
age_median -0.63*** -0.64*** -0.42** -0.72*** -0.63*** -0.64*** 
    
   
N Obs. 1567 1287 1281 1230 1210 1260 
R2 0.66 0.50 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.67 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A19: Secondary Education Quantile Aggregation (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: 
Unmp_Tot 
r2 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
    
   
oecd_epl -0.80** -1.16** -0.89** -0.93*** -0.61* 0.56* 
lagged_unmp  0.67***  0.71***  0.68***  0.66***  0.65***  0.54*** 
tax_wedge  0.03  0.10 -0.01 -0.04  0.09  0.00 
union_dens -0.02 -0.13*** -0.02 -0.04  0.02  0.12* 
unmp_ben  0.10***  0.11***  0.12***  0.12***  0.08***  0.01 
gdp_g -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.03** 
acc_cpi -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28***  0.01 
sec_educ -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08*** 
urb_proxy  0.00  0.01 -0.01 -0.05  0.00 -0.13 
tech_quota -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.10* 
age_median -0.63*** -0.67*** -0.66*** -0.69*** -0.56*** -0.55*** 
    
   
N Obs. 1567 1217 1270 1275 1305 1201 
R2 0.66 0.76 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.45 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A20: Urban Proxy Quantile Aggregation (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: 
Unmp_Tot 
r2 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
    
   
oecd_epl -0.80** -0.61* -0.72** -0.96*** -0.98*** -0.77 
lagged_unmp  0.67***  0.67***  0.67***  0.65***  0.66***  0.66*** 
tax_wedge  0.03  0.03  0.03 -0.01 -0.00  0.11* 
union_dens -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00  0.05 
unmp_ben  0.10***  0.10***  0.10***  0.12***  0.10***  0.06** 
gdp_g -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 
acc_cpi -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.12* 
sec_educ -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07** 
urb_proxy  0.00 -0.04  0.00 -0.03  0.05 -0.12 
tech_quota -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11** 
age_median -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.53*** -0.64*** -0.60*** -0.76*** 
 
      
N Obs. 1567 1281 1238 1256 1209 1284 
R2 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.63 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A21: Technological Level Quantile Aggregation (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: 
Unmp_Tot 
r2 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
    
   
oecd_epl -0.80** -2.15*** -0.73* -0.70** -0.55* -0.68** 
lagged_unmp  0.67***  0.54***  0.69***  0.70***  0.67***  0.66*** 
tax_wedge  0.03  0.17*  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
union_dens -0.02  0.10* -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
unmp_ben  0.10***  0.07***  0.10***  0.10***  0.10***  0.10*** 
gdp_g -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
acc_cpi -0.25*** -0.17** -0.19*** -0.26*** -0.31*** -0.29*** 
sec_educ -0.04 -0.08*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
urb_proxy  0.00  0.07  0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 
tech_quota -0.07 -0.12**  0.00 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 
age_median -0.63*** -0.74*** -0.72*** -0.65*** -0.60*** -0.53*** 
 
      
N Obs. 1567 1262 1238 1248 1241 1279 
R2 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.68 0.66 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A22: Age Median Quantile Aggregation (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: 
Unmp_Tot 
r2 q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
    
   
oecd_epl -0.80** -0.38 -0.93** -0.68* -0.83** -1.03** 
lagged_unmp  0.67***  0.61***  0.66***  0.67***  0.67***  0.69*** 
tax_wedge  0.03  0.07 -0.01  0.04  0.03 -0.01 
union_dens -0.02  0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
unmp_ben  0.10***  0.06***  0.11***  0.10***  0.09***  0.11*** 
gdp_g -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 
acc_cpi -0.25*** -0.09 -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.26*** 
sec_educ -0.04 -0.06** -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
urb_proxy  0.00  0.00  0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 
tech_quota -0.07 -0.10* -0.03 -0.07 -0.11* -0.08 
age_median -0.63*** -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.59*** -0.67*** -0.59*** 
 
      
N Obs. 1567 1327 1218 1267 1223 1233 
R2 0.66 0.58 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.67 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A23: EPR and sectorial Employment Rates (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Sector 
Employment Rate 
agr ind constr serv fin p.a. 
    
   
EPR 0.30 -0.92* 0.64* 0.76 -2.04*** 1.66*** 
 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 1535 1733 1726 1761 1716 1762 
R2 0.45 0.42 0.35 0.21 0.81 0.68 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
Table A24: EPT and sectorial Employment Rates (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Sector 
Employment Rate 
agr ind constr serv fin p.a. 
    
   
EPT 0.16* -0.05 0.15** -0.07 -0.22* -0.12 
 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 1535 1733 1726 1761 1716 1762 
R2 0.45 0.42 0.35 0.21 0.81 0.68 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
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Table A25: EPC and sectorial Employment Rates (2000-2008) 
Dep_Var: Sector 
Employment Rate 
agr ind constr serv fin p.a. 
    
   
EPC 0.02 -0.69* 0.19 0.08 -0.68 0.71* 
 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N Obs. 1535 1733 1726 1761 1716 1762 
R2 0.45 0.42 0.34 0.2 0.81 0.68 
Regional and Time Fixed Effect included. Legend: * p-value < 0.05; ** p-value < 0.01; *** p-value <0.001 
 
 
 
